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Chapter 1 :Youth Employment:  general outlook. 
1.1 Defining youth.   
 
Considering Standard Definition of United Nations, young people are that one aged from 15 to 24 
inclusive. However, there is a need to underline as practically this definition changes from country to 
country, considering also cultural, institutional and political factors. In developed countries and in  the 
Central and in The Eastern European economies,  the lower age limit is equal to the statutory 
minimum during school living age, however, the higher limit  vary significantly between countries. For 
example, if we consider  United Kingdom’s  New Deal, for young it considers people from 18 to 24 
years old( with a special treatment from 16 to 17), while in Italy it dramatically changes, considering 
people from 14-29(in the north), and 14-32( in the south).  Developing countries often don’t have 
minimum school-leaving age; this is one the most important cause which determines early labor 
market experience for young people1  . In Germany, for example,   the rate of those aged (16-24) is 
approximately the same as the adults; which meaning that dual apprenticeship system is working in 
good way2.  
 
1.1.1 OECD  Countries.  
 
In the countries of the Organization for the Economics Co-operation and Development (OECD) the 
unemployment rate of young people was 20.5 points percentage in 2013, while for adults this has 
been estimated to be 7.2 per cent (so more than double of youth are unemployed). 
If it possible, for developing countries data show a worse situation, above all if we consider women.  
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 In this study we are not going to study child laborissue.  
2




1.1.2 Middle East. 
 
The Middle East has the highest youth unemployment rate of all regions. More than one in four 
economically active young people are unemployed. The youth unemployment rate is estimated at 
28.6 per cent, and is projected to increase gradually to 30.00 per cent in 2018. Together with North 
Africa, The Middle East is one of the two regions in which the total unemployment rate (across all age 
groups) exceed 10.2 in 2014; however given the high youth-to adults ratio of unemployment rate 
(4.0), as well as the youthful population in this region, youth bear the brunt of the unemployment 
problem, constituting the 45 per cent of unemployed.     
 
1.1.3 North Africa. 
 
As in the Middle East, the youth unemployment rate in North Africa is very high, at 25.00 per cent in 
2014. The unemployment rate for young women is even higher, at 38.0 per cent, compared with 18.5 
per cent for young men in 2014.  
Despite the disadvantages position of young people, their share of total unemployment has been 
(slowly) decreasing due to demographic changes; in particular the share of youth in the population 
has been falling.  In 2000, one in three persons of working age population were aged between 15 and 
24, but this proportion dropped to 28 per cent, and it is projected to fall to one in four persons in 
2015.  
However, there is a need to underline that there is a great heterogeneity between countries by sex. In 
Morocco, in 2011 unemployment rate for male and female were fairly close (18.1 for male and 17.4 
for female) while in Algeria, young women were more affected by unemployment rate than young 
men. The female youth unemployment rate in this country was 37.5 per cent in 2010, while the male 
youth unemployment rate stood at 18.7 per cent. 3 
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1.1.4 Sub-Sahara Africa.  
 
In this region there has been, (and it is still in act) a strong economic growth which has influenced a 
positive way labor market indicators. For example, in Ghana the average growth rate is estimated of   
6.5 per cent in the last ten years, and the unemployment rate decrease more than fifty per cent; 
additionally Ghana Labor Force Survey shows a contemporary decrease of a vulnerable employment 
too. It clearly shows how in the last twenty years there was a decrease from 80 to 75 per cent of 
vulnerable employment, and considering youth issue, the average regional unemployment rate 
decrease by almost 1 percentage point from 13.4 per cent to 12.3 per cent. All other developing 
countries show a higher decrease of vulnerable employment, but in more cases with a lower increase 
of economic growth. However, a common trend that is needed to underline is that the manufacture 




Employment in Asia and in the Pacific is estimated to increase by 1.7 point percent in 2015. Looking 
forward, employment growth is projected to out-space working age population growth, resulting in a 
slight increase in the employment to population ratio between 2009 and 2017(from 66.6 to 67.0 per 
cent). The labor force participation is expected to remain steady at around 70 per cent.  
The unemployment rate   in this region is decreasing during the last years, from an average of 6 per 
cent between 2000 and 2008 to around 4.3 per cent projected over the next years.  
In Indonesia, the unemployment rate is at 5.8 compared with an average of 9.1 between 2000 and 
2008.  
Women are more likely to be unemployed than men, (6.3compared with 5.5 per cent); on the other 
hand in Philippines the women unemployment rate is at 7.2 per cent, almost the same also for men.  
In addition, there is a need to underline how in this region youth unemployment rate remains the 




1.1.6 South Asia. 
 
Labor market in South Asia, as in the past, is dominated by informal and agricultural employment, 
where job are generally poor and unprotected. Some labor force indicator are able to explain very  
well the situation is this region: labor force participation is one of the lowest in the word; for youth 
the situation is always worse; reaching 39.6 per cent in 2014, which an increase of education 
enrollment, especially in secondary schooling.                
However, employment growth is stronger in the last years (1.1 in 2013 and 1.2 in 2014); above all for 
women. However, the official indicator are not able to clearly explain the situation, simple because, as 
explained before, employment is informal and under poverty conditions. 
 
 
1.1.7 Latin America and Caribbean.  
 
The youth unemployment rate in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from 17.6 cent in 2003 
to 13.5 per cent in 2008. The crisis has increased the rate to 15.4 per cent 2009, but from 2010 the 
regional unemployment rate reached 12.9 in 2012. The ratio of youth to adult unemployment rate, 
which was 2.5 in 2000, gradually increased and now the common value is 2.8. In Argentina, for 
example, the ratio was 3.0 in the early years of past decades, but it reached 3.3 in 2007 and increased 
to 3.6 in 2011.  
The youth unemployment rate in these regions has always been characterized by the level of 
education; however these differences are not always in favor of those with highest education. This 
was what exactly happened in 2012, where the youth unemployment rate for people with 
intermediate level of education was 7.1 points percentage, while for people with basic education level 
was 6.6 points percentage.  In Chile, workers with a secondary level of education also have the 
highest unemployment rate, (7.3 per cent in October 2012, compared with 4.5 per cent for primary 
education workers and 3.1 per cent for workers with and advanced education4.   
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1.2 A labor market for youth? 
 
 Young people have a lot of difficulties to get a job, and there are several reasons to explain this issue: 
-First, young workers that are new entrants in the labor market cannot compete with old ones for 
skills and experiences, so they can have probability to get only unskilled job.                
However, the belief that one age group of worker can be replaced with another is not likely to be 
widespread; in several cases employees don’t consider young and old workers in the same way. Some 
works indeed requires skills which are, or should be very common among young people, as for 
example adaptability, while other jobs can require more adults characteristic, such as experiences and 
responsibility.                            
There were programs explicitly designed to encourage the substitution of young work with old ones, 
as for example in France with the “Allocation de replacement pour l’emploi (ARPE). Under this 
measure, early retirement was subsidized by the Government on condition that the employee hires a 
replacement under the same contractual agreement as the person retiring. Also if it  was not clearly  
specified, applicants under 26 years of age were  give special attention; this procedure was not usual 
but the aim was to encourage a turn-over of workforce through voluntary replacement of older 
workers with young ones. However, the results were not achieved: in fact the primary aim was to be 
able to employ 80.000 young people by the end of 1996, but the programs approached only 60.000 
ones (Gineste, 1997). Then, the replacement rate was lower than expected, despite the explicit aim of 
the measure.                        
Different measures are which ones with the aim to encourage the recruitment of young people 
instead of existing older employers by reducing the relative cost of hiring young workers. 
Furthermore, Begg et all (1991) found that 80 per cent of the jobs “created” were works already 
existing, or which would have been created also without YTS; additionally only nine per cent of those 
jobs were for workers aged 19 and above, the replacement rate was between young aged 16 and 24 
years old, to additionally underline as the young have also been, and continue to be a “false threat” to 





1.2.1 The “real” estimation of youth employment. 
 
The “real” estimation of the unemployed in general, and in this case of youth unemployment in 
particular, has to be done taking into account the discouraged workers. It is very important because 
basically it includes to the standard definition of unemployed youth those who are not technically 
unemployed because they do not meet the active job search criteria but who would like to work. 
There are a lot advantages to use it:                                                                                                                      
-firstly, it is able to capture information on discouraged  people that are not “usefully occupied”, and 
would like to work if job market improve;                     
-secondly, in this sense we are going to have a sense of the size  of the youth labor market problem in 
relation to the youth labor market as whole;                          
-thirdly, it helps in the interpretation of the employment adjustment process. For sure, if we don’t 
include these ones, we don’t have a real estimation of unemployment, above all for the dimension of 
the active labor policy that the policymakers have to do.  Instead if we consider the labor market for 
young people in developing countries, it is very different from the developed ones.  
 
1.2.2 Youth labor market in developing and developed countries.  
 
Youth labor market in developing economies is characterized by an increasing demand for workers, a 
scarcity of capital and a persistent conflict between “old way” to do economies and the modern one 
(it can been considered as geographical conflict, between rural and urban part of countries; this is also 
because the cost of workers is lower than buying or renting machinery.     
Figure 1 5  suggests how labor market experiences and the quality of jobs for young people differ 
significantly between developed and developing countries. There are several reasons for these 
differences: there are economical, juridical and social issue to take into consideration.  
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  Its aim is to compare aggregate data on youth labor market situation from least developed countries 
(LDCs)-Cambodia, Liberia, Malawi and Togo, with aggregate data from four high-income European 
countries(Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal). In this figure youth are divided in four 
categories:   
-A) regular employment, defined as wage and salaried workers holding a contract of unlimited 
duration (in the case of high-income countries), or a contract of a duration greater than 12 months (in 
the case of LDCs);  
-B) irregular employment, defined as wage and salaried workers holding a contract of limited 
duration(less than 12 months in the case of LDCs and undefined in the case of the high-income 
countries); 
-C) unemployed (relaxed definition), defined as a person currently without work and available to take 
up work in the week prior to the reference period;  




















Figure 1. Distribution of youth population by regular and irregular employment, unemployment (relaxed 
definition and inactivity for four LDCs and four high-income countries (%). 
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Figure 1 suggests two conclusions: first, the main differences between youth in developing economies 
and in developed ones are in the shares of irregular employment and inactivity.  It is very important to 
underline because, as explained before, the size of unemployment dramatically changes. Second, 
when we use the relaxed definitions of unemployment, rates are more similar, the explanation has to 
be found in the level of educational attainment: in developed economies generally young people go 












enrolment remains low and educational attainment levels are still extremely low, with small 
proportion of youth attaining a secondary education. The mean of educational attainment among the 
young Population in Cambodia, Liberia, Malawi and Togo in 2013 were 6.2 per cent considering 
people with primary level education or lower, 33.7 for young people with secondary level of 
education and 4.1 per cent with higher-level degree. 
The main difference between developing and developed countries is that in the last one young people 
are generally  enrol in a school course, so they are considered as inactive, then increasing inactivity;  
while in developing countries young people generally  are not enrolled in  school, they are engaged in 
irregular employment. In contrast with irregular employment developed economies nine of ten are 
engaged in temporary wage employment.   
 
1.2.3 The incidence of job part-time. 
 
For OECD, the incidence of part-time work for youth increase from 20.8 per cent in 2000 to 29.3 per 
cent in 2011 per cent from 2000 to 22.3 per cent in 2008, but it increased to 25 per cent in the 2011. 
In North America youth part time employment grew from 18 per cent, so there was a widespread use 
of part-time job: in fact in 2000 the young part time workers were the 28.4 per cent of the full time 
ones and in 2009 they were the 34.3 per cent, but instead in European Countries, the percentage 
decrease from the 2010 to the 2011 (in the midst of the crisis). For all these reasons, youth 
employment policies are the highest priority, with a particular target on first job-seekers.  To win this 
that can be defined as the crisis of the youth, there is a need to extend the youth employment 
policies to those countries don’t yet have actuated this type of policy. The area where is most 
important to intervene is area that regard macroeconomic and sector policies, social dialogue and 






1.3 Youth employment and skills mismatch in advanced economies. 
 
The issue of skill mismatch has always received more attention in the advanced economies due to 
economic crisis; however various form of skill mismatch are always present in the labor market. Skill 
demand and supply are influenced by a range of factors including for example the level of economic 
development of a country and technological change.  For this reason, the 
implementation/formulation of effective education and training policies are become really important 
above all after the crisis.                       
However, in this chapter will be analyzed only two types of skills mismatch6.It are due simply because 
they are really common for young people and for this reason they have been included: the first one 
has the aim to compare the level of school education between employed and unemployed. As 
primary comment, there is a high risk of mismatch for those at the bottom at the educational 
pyramid. The second type consists in the mismatch between jobs held by young works and the 
qualifications they possess. The main result is that type of mismatch are that youth (meaning in this 
case people aged from 15-29) are more likely to be exposed to over-education than workers aged 30 
and above.   
 
1.3.1 Skill mismatch between labor supply and demand.  
  
The skill mismatch between labor supply and demand of skill has been quantified using an index 
called   “Duncan and Duncan index of dissimilarity7”. Its aim is to compare the structure of educational 
achievement of the employed and unemployed, capturing the mismatch if unemployment rates differ 
among workers with different level of education achievement8 .  This index has a range equal from 
0(no mismatch) to 100(full mismatch), with value equal zero if workers with primary, secondary and 
tertiary education have the same rate of unemployment rate.        
                                                          
6
 However, there is a need to underline that that there is no agreed definition of skills mismatch.  It is a term which refers 
to various types’ imbalances between skills offered and skills needed in the world of the word. Additionally, each type of 
mismatch can be measured in several ways, with relative advantages disadvantages. Taking in consideration these issue, 
the choice has been to analyze the mismatches describe in the chapter.    
7
 It is the most widely index know to measure segregation by sex( Anker, Melkas and Korten, 2003) 
8
 For more detail about it use, see Johansen and Gatelli(2012) 
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Several type of this skill mismatch has been seen among countries.  Considering as sample of 28 
European Countries, skill mismatch was less than 10 per cent in 8 countries in 2011, exceed 20 in four 
Countries (Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden). Furthermore, there is a need to underline 
that this skill percentage of skill mismatch is not an indication of quality of school system, because if it 
would have been really of high quality, it would improve the employability of workers.                     
A high level of mismatch corresponds to wide differences between   unemployment rates between 
youth with different level of education.                                               
Considering  Sweden , for example, the youth unemployment rate with primary education or lower is 
equal to 38.6, is more than three times the rate for youth with tertiary education(1.2.4 per cent). 
However, there is a need to underline as there is also example of countries with more similar problem 
of unemployment rate by level of education, which is reflected in a low value of the mismatch index.  
In Switzerland, for example, the index was 1.6 per cent in 2011. The youth unemployment rate with 
primary education was 7.8 per cent in 2011 on this country, compared with 7.5 per cent for you with 
secondary education and 8.5 per cent for youth with tertiary education.  As explained before, Belgium 
has a relatively high level of mismatch; it is increasing in the recent years because of deteriorating 
position of workers with a low level of education. The youth unemployment rate for workers with 
primary education in Belgium increased from 2009 to 2011(from 30.2 to 31 per cent).  This trend has 
been confirmed  by the whole 28 countries, the unemployment rate for youth with primary education 











1.3.2 Skill mismatch by occupation. 
 
 
Another type of skill mismatch, very linked with labor supply and demand, is the skill match between 
the skills that young people have and skills required in their job.  In fact some (a lot) workers can be 
undereducated or overeducated for their jobs.  Regarding the issue of over education, this type of 
mismatch has been rising in many countries; it can be explained by competition for jobs, which 
pushes the better educated into jobs or occupations with lower remuneration usually taken by people 
with lower education. Furthermore, there is a need to underline that this type of skills mismatch has 
negative implications and they are going to increase in times of economic and labor market crisis.  
   
1.4 NEET young people.  
 
 
NEET young people are which ones that are employed, neither in education nor in training aged 15-
29. Its rates have risen in 30 of 40 countries with data available to ILO.                                                         
It is very important   issue to take into consideration, mainly because it is a very feature of young 
people that, after completing their high school, are forced to be in this “State”, without having 
possibilities to avoid it.  NEET people have to be distinguished from the newly coined NLEET use in 2013 
in Global Employment rate for youth by International labor Organization. It include young people “neither 
in labor force nor in education, employment and training”. It is similar to NEET but excludes the 
unemployed since they are still included in labor force. The figure 2 shows the latest result by IL 






Figure2: Young People that are neither in employment, nor education or training (NEET) as the share of 








                                                          
9
 Source: ILO (2013, table 10C).  



































1.4.1 Policies for youth employment. 
 
Youth Employment crisis won’t have solution without strong youth employment policies which will 
lead to employment growth; this requires coordinated policy efforts to support aggregate demand via 
macroeconomic policies, and expansion of domestic economies.            
Furthermore, also policies which increase productive investment and improve access to finance can 
have a positive impact on young’s people employment prospects; this can be done through:  
-Encouraging economic diversification;                                        
reducing macroeconomic volatility;                                   
-helping people for access to credit for enterprises(micro-small and medium sized);                         
-having funding for targeted youth employment interventions.                                          
Also if we have to underline that there are several sectors have been identified with a high job-
creation potential, such as green economy, health and social care, information and communication.                                                                                                                                                                     
To confirmation of this also an econometric analysis about the impact of macroeconomic 
determinants on youth employment has been done by Matsumoto ET all (2012).                               
They affirmed that   higher is investment; lower is the youth unemployment rate in both industrialized 
and low and middle-income economies. However, investment is strongly linked to access and cost of 
credit: when banks don’t want to lend money, or they want to lend only with a high interest rate, 
firms have more difficult to hire young workers.                               
Furthermore, also policies that offer fiscal incentives, support development of infrastructure can offer 
a wide range of youth employment opportunity.    
 
1.4.2 Policies for training and education.  
 
Training and education are very important for youth employment outcomes. Despite significant 
improvements in educational attainment, there are several countries (above all developed ones), in 
which people have lower level of education. In order to respond to labor market requirements, 
training and skills via education should ensure skills which are useful for employment. The presence of 
work-experience components in technical vocational education and training (TVET) is very useful 
20 
 
because it increases the capacity of trainers to improve their skills. Also the employment services 
have a significant role to help people from school to work   transition. In particular, through individual 
career guidance, the preparation of functional curriculum vitae and support in the development of 
employment plans, cab be very useful for young people for the first time(and not only in labor 
market).  This services can be realized also in collaboration with education institutions providing their 
career guidance; detailed occupation information, including clear indications of main duties, 
environmental factors, and salary range for the various entry point.                                                                                                                                                                       
            
1.4.2.1 Dual apprenticeship system.  
 
The “dual system” of apprenticeship combines school-based education with in-company training. It is 
a system of learning   for work in Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Switzerland.  In these countries, 
low youth employment rate is often attributed to the effectiveness of this system, which provides a 
lot of young people with high education and training recognizing qualifications demanded by 
enterprise. The content of the German system includes the following features:  
-The content of training is determined jointly by government, representatives of employer’s 
organization and trade union at federal level;                              
Individual firms choose their own training methods;                    
Training costs are shared between the government and employers; in particular governments covers 
the school-based component; employers finance enterprise-based training);           
Qualifications are awarded upon completion of  written and practical exams, set and market by 
tripartite external examiners;                      
-After graduation, workers can apply to their current employer or another for employment10.   
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1.5 Youth targeted labor market policies.  
 
Labor market policies and programs can be very useful to improve labor market integration of young 
people.    
Active labor market policies (ALMP’s) focusing on employment planning and job search has been 
really effective to help people to find a job11.  These interventions usually combine education and 
training with work experience programs and job search assistance ,as well as incentives for  
employers to hire disadvantages people, as for example wage subsides, tax cuts or social security 
exemptions for a limited period for employers who hire young people.’               
In February 2013, the European’s (EU) Council of Employment and Social Affairs Ministers approved 
“Youth Guarantee”, with the aim to offer an employment, continued education, an apprenticeship or 
a traineeship within four months of leaving school or becoming unemployed. In addition, has been 
allocated 6 billion for the period 2014-2020 to regions where youth unemployment rate exceeds 25 
per cent12.                                                   
Targeting of disadvantages group in the labor market is crucial for the design and implementation of 
ALMP’S. There are many examples of approaches that establish “profile” for young people, these 
approach also have the advantages to allocate resource more efficiently because they allow to 





                                                          
11
 ALMP’S  policies topic will be treated in very detailed way  
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1.5.1   Youth guarantee as response to the youth employment crisis.  
 
The first countries to implement youth guarantees in the 1980s and 1990s were Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden; more recently, other countries are implementing it, as for example Austria, Germany, 
The Netherlands and Poland.                 
Its  main aims are to promote labor market integration and prevent long-term unemployment and 
discouragement among young people; are broadly similar across country; also if there are some 
differences between programs, as for example eligibility criteria, duration of intervention and 
compensation.                                                    
Swedish youth guaranteed, which regarded youth unemployed aged 24 years, participating in the 
program in 2008 were able to find a job faster than a control group of participants in other PES 
measure.                        
Also if other evaluation are needed, and an  ILO overview confirms that youth guarantee can play a 
very important role in reducing long term unemployment and discouragement among young man and 
women13. However, the same overview underlines the need of implement funds dedicated to it; ILO’s 
cost estimates suggest that it can be implemented at an annual cost in mean between 0.5 and 1.5 per 
cent of GDP. The variation of costs is due by the availability of administrative infrastructure for the 
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The aim of this chapter is to give an overview on youth and their relative issues: firstly, as explained at 
the beginning, there is a need to   define what “youth term”, include (and how there are several for 
youth in different countries).  After, youth unemployment and employment rate is analyzed for all 
worlds:  OECD Countries, Middle East, North and Sub-Sahara Africa, North and South Asia, and at the 
end Latin America and Caribbean.  The next step is to question if really a youth labor market exist, 
simply because there are several obstacles (a completion with adult), that suggest that in some case 
youth labor market is only a utopia.  And it also for this reason that the next step is to analyze youth 
labor market in developing and developed countries, making comparison where useful and underling 
differences (clearly a very important role is played by job part-time and its incidence in both markets) 
A part of this chapter is used to describe  youth employment skills and the their mismatch between 
supply and demand ;but unfortunately it is not  the  only one: a paragraph  indeed  describes also skill 
mismatch by occupation(they are the most frequent and important mismatch  in the labor, so other 
types  have not been taken into consideration). The last part of this chapter is dedicated to analyze a 
most important issue that it can be considered also worse that “general” unemployment issue: in fact, 
it considers young people that are not in employment, but additionally, there are not in training too.  
In the last five years there have been a lot of policies actuated to help them to get job (via training or 
via occupation); and for this reason two most important programs are analyzed: Youth Guarantee and 
more generally, dual apprenticeship system. 
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 Chapter  2 : Minimum wage, labor market institutions and policies: a cross 






2.1      Labor market institutions: definition. 
 
The laws, practices and policies which can be defined as labor market institution determining  which 
type of legal contract is permissible, set boundaries for wages and benefits , hours and working 
conditions; define  the roles of collective representation and bargaining, providing  social protection 
for workers are called labor market institutions. The existence of these institutions is due to the 
imperfect information, not equal market power between employee and worker, discrimination and 
inadequacies of the market to provide insurance for employment-related risks. They were born in the 
second half of the 19 the century after the industrialization of Western Europe and North America 
 
 
2.1.1    The aims of employment protection legislation.  
 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is one of the most important labor institution which provides 
measure job security by restricting the ability of employee to hire worker with the aim of determine 
work and by making dismissal cost. In particular, the EPL regards to the method of start and end of 
employment.  EPL provide measure of job security by restricting the ability of employee to hire 
worker with the aim to determine work and by making dismissal costly.  Governs introduce these two 
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types of rules to give an insurance in the case of job loss and to give at the employee some social 




2.1.2    Economic theory on EPL:  the neutrality case. 
  
Economic theory on  EPL and its no effect on employment, welfare and profit for firms, taking into  
consideration  the neutrality case explained by  Lazar(1990), which occurs when we have three 
conditions:  
-1 workers are risk neutral,  
-2 Wages are flexible, not wage floor, (then not minimum wage or collective agreement),  
-3 EPL consist only of the transfer component, while tax component is equal to zero.  
Lazar talks about neutrality because EPL affects only the intertemporal structure of wage, leaving the 
net discounted value of a job unchanged. Suppose we have initially two time periods, with a wage 
equal to win both periods, reminding that we are under risk neutrality assumptions and not wage 
floor. Now we introduce an EPL cost which employee have to pay after the two periods.  The aim of 
the employee is to pay the same wage with and without EPL policies, so it means that he offers in the 
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 OECD 2004.  
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2.1.3 Unions and collective agreements: impact and role.  
 
Unions and Collective agreements are probably the most difficult and controversial labor market 
institutions to analyze, also because they influence living standard, and in our case of interest both 
minimum wage and employment rate for youth. Economist have recognized several roles to the 
unions, above all to negotiate higher wages, better condition and benefit; but often it can be done 
through efficiency cost.  
 
 
2.2 History of trade unions.  
 
Trade unions are voluntary organizations; their aim is to protect the interest of their enrolled.   First 
trade unions born in the XVIII century in the United Kingdom with the aim to give insurance to the 
artisans in case of unemployment. With the pass of the time, they transformed itself in industrial 
trade unions to represent workers with intermediate-high skills.                  
Actually join a union depends by several factors, one of them is also the collective bargaining system. 
In some people we have local negotiation; on other one it is national. Generally, trade unions 
negotiate all aspects of a contract. In detail way, they have a very important role in the determination 
of wage (minimum if it is applied), benefits, security and insurance.  
 
2.2.1 Economic analysis of the union: the utility function.  
 
Economic analysis of union is based on the fact that it can be represented through a utility function, 
as well as an individual. Generic assumption is that the utility of union depends positively by the wage 
W and Occupation E. Then the indifference curve or union is represented in the usual form as we can 






The firm is represent by a demand of work upward which determine the optimal quantity of work, in 
the sense of maximization of profit, to use for any level of wage.  
2.2.2   The assumption of monopolist union: interpretation of the graph.  
 
 At this point economist use a very strong hypothesis called hypothesis of monopolist union15:               
It chooses the level of wage compatible with their goals, in equal way of a monopolist which 
determine the price of his/her product. 16 If, given a wage, firms cannot transfer form demand curve, 
the hypothesis of union monopolist which maximize owner utility, led to a representation of  
agreement between firm and union  as the point M in which demand curve is tangent to the 
indifference curve of union U, where  the competitive wage of union is w*. Without union, firm would 
hire E* work. Union instead wants a wage equal to We e so firm cut occupation. In that way some 
workers don’t work, and it is clear that union would have major utility if labor demand would be 
                                                          
15
 See Borjas, Chapter 10 “Unions”. Italian Version by Lorenzo Cappellari  
16
 “Alternative hypothesis consider that also the firm can have some contractual power. In that case the equilibrium would 
determine by a tug of war between firm and union. ”From Borjas, Chapter 10 Union”   
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inelastic, that is the firms react less because of a variation of wage. In the figure above that situation 
is represent by the curve D’ (more inelastic than D), and M’ curve (higher wage), so union could reach 
an indifference curve with major utility. 
2.2.3   The unions and the efficiency of the labor market.  
 
In the sector where we have the presence of unions, the wage is higher despite of a competitive 
market, and so the occupation is lower. If the worker of the union market find job in a non-union 
market, where wage and occupation are determined by the market, the oversupply is absorbed by 
wage cuts.   
 
2.3 What happens to the market equilibrium without unions? 
 
Without unions, the competitive wage is w* and the sum of national income is given by ABCD and 
A’BCD’. Unions increase wage in the sectors one. Hired workers move to the sector 1 to the sector 2 
decreasing wage never contract by the union Win. In that case the sum of area reduced national 
income of the area of triangle EBF, which is defined as net loss of production because union is hiring 
























2.3.1 Efficient contract and contract curve: Why both do firms and unions move of 
their initial point of equilibrium? 
 
The following table shows because both firms and unions have an incentive to move on the 
equilibrium on the labor demand curve:  
 
-Diagram 3 
    
The competitive point of equilibrium is P (with wage w* occupation E* and utility of unions U*). The 
equilibrium point of Union is M where we>w*, me<E* and Um>U*.   Union accepts all contracts along 
the M curve and above the utility curve UM, while the firm accepts all contracts long or under the is-
profit curve πm. In point R, unions is better and firm is not worse than point M. In Q point employee is 
better and union is not worse. Any point in line RQ is a Pareto improvement despite of equilibrium 





2.3.2 The relationship between labor Market Institutions and minimum wages.   
 
An important part of today’s labor economics has been increasingly concerned with the issue of labor 
market institutions/regulations, and their interactions and impact.  In particular, the interactions 
between minimum wage and some institutions are really evident if we consider, for example, that 
they cover minimum wage setting. It is the case of trade unions; they have a really and determinant 
impact on minimum wage (and its increase or decrease), so we cannot talk about minimum wage 




2.4 Minimum wage: A brief history-Which is its role in the global economy?   
                                                                                    
Minimum wage was for the first time introduced in New Zealand in the late 19th Century, and now is 
adopted in several counties. Minimum wage can be a most important and powerful tool to support 
decent work goals, but it can be also crucial to improve social protection floor, poverty alleviation 
effort and above all equality of work. So the increasing of the minimum wage with the pass of time 
has become very important because it can help to rebalance the sources of growth.  In the last 
decades there has been an increasing interest about the role of the minimum wage; for Example In 
Brazil it has been consider the key role to reduce poverty,  while China the increasing  has been  
considered the most important policy to reduce inequality in the country.  In the United Kingdom, 
where the minimum wage was introduced at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it was 
considered as a successful Government policy. Also in the United States, the introduction and then 
the increasing of it was considered a redistributive tool, in the sense of equality and poverty. The 
increasing of the minimum wage can stimulate also domestic aggregate demand. It was the case of 
United States, Japan, China and Germany, where also with two different, but interconnected 
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strategies, were able to stimulate the aggregate demand via increase of the minimum wage. So, in 
this context, minimum wages if set and operated effectively can play a key role to reduce inequality 
and support demand transferring resources to low-paid workers.  Such redistribution   can have   
positive demand effect because the marginal propensity to invest out of profit17. For sure  higher 
minimum wage stimulate investment by the family, because  higher minimum wage above all  among 
the low and middle income groups can lead to a virtuous cycle of greater consumption due to  the 


















                                                          
17
 Herr ET all, 2009; Ludovic, 2009, Stockhammer, 2012; Stockhammer ET all 2007. 
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2.4.1   The aim of the minimum wage and its system across the world.   
  
The primary aim of minimum wage has been to increase equality, but this can happen only if we 
increment the number of people which are “legal covered” by the minimum wage.18 The ILO working 
condition Law report show us, as   151 countries and territories which are actually implementing the 
extension of the number of workers covered by the minimum wage. For sure there are differences 
about the method and also the time of implementation of working conditions which can vary by state. 
Figure 3 shows the minimum wage system across the world (the percentage covered by the simple 
national or regional minimum wage or by multiple minimum wages by industry).  
 
                                                          
18






The figure clearly shows as in the word the percentage of States which adapt simple or regional 
minimum wage is   exactly the same of that one having multiple minimum wages. However, it is able 
also to show the difference between regions: excluding Asia and The Pacific Area, other parts are 
dominated by a net using of one of them.  
2.4.2 The successful of minimum wage policy.   
 
Another issue to consider is that the success of the policy about minimum wage depends also by the 
level at which it is set.  If it is low, it could be not effective in the aim to ensure living standard 
conditions, and so, there will be no investment, consumption, then the aggregate demand would fall. 
But, if it increases suddenly, we could lead to inflation and hurt employment (Belser and Sobeck, 
2012).                                                                                                                       
The  ILO minimum wage  fixing convention, 1970 number  131  at article 2 states:  “Minimum wages 













All regions Africa Asia and The
Pacific
Europe and CIS Middle East Americans and
The Caribbean
Determination of Minimum wage across the 
world 
Figure 3  
 
Simple national or regional minimum wage
Multiple minimum wage by industry and/or occupation
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make the person or persons concerned liable to appropriate penal or other sanctions.”, while  articles 
3 states:  “The elements to be taken into consideration in determining the level of minimum wages 
shall, so far as possible and appropriate in relation to national practice and conditions, include:              
-(a) the needs of workers and their families, taking into account the general level of wages in the 
country, the cost of living, social security benefits, and the relative living standards of other social 
groups;                                                                                                                     
-(b) economic factors, including the requirements of economic development, levels of productivity 
and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a high level of employment19. So in that convention 
the man is the centre of interest and need; the role of minimum wage should be to guarantee the 
satisfaction of the worker and his family. One way to fix the minimum wage is using   the ratio of 
minimum to median wage, but however there are other instruments to do that(also if the first one is 
the best way  to measure and then  most used).  
 
2.4.3 The compliance of the minimum wage.  
 
 First off all, the degree of compliance depends on the complexity of the system. In uniform system it 
is easier to ensure compliance despite of system of a multiple minimum wage rate (as for example 
happens in Italy).  Second, if there is higher minimum wage, it could encourage the informal economy.  
Another thing to consider is that high rate of compliance required a coherent strategy based on labor 
inspections, information. There are many way to measure compliance: one could be calculating the 
share of workers’ earning less than the legal minimum wage. The rate of compliance also depends on 
the level at which the minimum wages are set. However, the most important thing to take into 
account is that if the minimum wages are set appropriately and operated effectively, the low paid 
worker will have benefits. It happens in some Latin American countries, where both the institution of 
a minimum wage and sudden its raising with effective social protection measures led to an improving 
of the economies of this countries.    
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2.4.4 Minimum wage and employment:  competitive labor market theory.  
 
Labor marketis the place where workers and employees meet and compare wages with supply of 
occupation. In the perfect and competitive Labor Market the interaction between demand of work 
(employees) and supply (workers) give us the equilibrium level of wages and work:  the level of wages 












2.4.5 How to interpret the graph. 
 
As we can see, the labor supply is upwards orientated, so the substitution effects prevail on income 
effect.  The demand is downwards orientated. The equilibrium level of wage and occupation is in the 
point where labor demand is equal to labor supply (w* and L*).  So, at equilibrium point we have L 
number of worker at wage equal to w*. If the minimum wage is above to that of equilibrium, the 
employment unequivocally be reduced from L* to   Ld., and labor supply exceeds labor demand. The 
quantity of this  effect  depends by how much the employee are able to substitute workers with other 
factors(so called substitute effect); more technically it depends by the elasticity of demand, so if 




2.4.6 Higher minimum wage:  Which are the effects?   
 
 A  higher minimum wage attracts other workers, and the state of this depends by how are considered 
“unemployed or discourage worker”, for sure the increase of the minimum wage has the effect to 
“invite” other workers to become active in the search of work, but also could discourage mostly the 
workers because there are fewer possibilities to find a job. Impolite in 2003 showed as   the 
competitive doesn’t tolerate much impact of a binding minimum wage if, as several empirical studies 
have revealed worker can adjust effort level. This theory is more similar to efficiency wage effect, in 
that sense the disequilibrium caused by the minimum wage in traditional model cannot persist. So in 
this model the introduction of minimum wage create unemployed.  There are a several assumptions 
which make the model not realistic and the most important is the idea of   perfectly competitive 







2.4.7 Monopsony in the  labor market.  
 
In a non-competitive labor market characterized by several imperfections, the consequences of an 
introduction of a minimum wage are very difficult to predict. Introducing a minimum wage we can 
effectively increase employment (also for youth), but only if employees have monopolistic power, and 
there are some externalities connected to the job searching.   A non-competitive labor market is the 
monopsony,   where we have one employee and more workers, a situation in which an introduction 
of minimum wage led an opposite effect, so it increases employment instead of decrease, within 
some relevant range of wage.  So, to attract additional labour, it has to increase wage, but instead if it   
decreases wage not all   labor force will be lost. In the monopsony  minimum wage has the role to 
equate marginal cost to average cost rendering a part of  monopolist’s supply and marginal cost of 
labor coincident, so eliminating the constraints posed by the rising marginal cost associated with 
hiring an additional worker and induces the monopolist to increase employment. However, the 
increasing of wage depends on the elasticity of labor supply.   














  Mathematically speaking, the pure monopolist chooses the employment level that maximizes 
profits. 
 





2.4.8 The introduction of minimum wage in monopsony labor market.  
 
In case of introduction of minimum wage in a monopsony labor market, the labor supply became 
horizontal, the wage up to the point at which minimum wage intersects demand curve. This is 








In the same way, because of monopolist pay less than marginal productivity of labor, the wage will be 
less in case of competitive labor market.  Generally, we can say that the difference between two 
wages can be considered as a signal of the monopolistic power of the employees; it increases when 
the slope of labor supply increases and, in detail way, it decreases when the elasticity of labor supply 
respect to the wage.                                                                                      
In a monopsony labor market, then, a minimum wage fixed at intermediate level between 
monopsony and competitive equilibrium, led to an increase of both wages and employment. 
However, it is very important to underline as a wage higher than the one of the competitive labor 
market, could led to a level of employment that would be inferior to the level of competitive labor 
market.  So, in the monopsony, we have a non-monotonic relationship between minimum wage and 
employment: for low levels of minimum wage, its increase led to an increase of employment, while 
after threshold we can observe the traditional negative relationship between minimum wage and 
employment. Some studies regarding the introduction of the minimum wage in a   labor market have 
not been taken into consideration because it is not so easy to have a market where we have only an 
employee.   
 
2.5 Is it possible to increase employment introducing a minimum wage in a 
monopsony labor market? 
 
Several economists tried to give an answer to this debate question.   The most influent part of them, 
affirm that it is possible only if the wage is not really high, and that the effort of the workers to finding 








2.5.1   Minimum wage in dual economy.  
 
Minimum wage cannot have a negative effect on employment in a dual economy in which the 
minimum wage is not applied to the secondary o informal market.                             
However, in this case, we can have some negative effect that has been defined by economist as 
spillover effect. As affirmed by Garlic (1976), Mincer and Welch (1976), an increase of minimum wage 
in the covered sector, led some workers pass from the cover to uncovered sector; so as explained in 
the figure, if in the uncovered sector labor supply increase, it led to a decrease of wage.  In this case 
minimum wage has the function to transfer workers from covered to uncovered sector generating a 
higher difference between the two wages.  This is explained by diagram 6  
 



















































2.6 The efficiency wage model: the effort curve.  
 
 Efficiency wage model suggests firm to pay a wage major to that of full employment so the workers 
will be more productive. It implies less labor force turnover, less cost training and better motivated 
worker. So, for the efficiency wage model wage doesn’t reduce wage because it would mean reduce 
productivity. All this is explained by the effort curve(diagram 5),  based on idea that effort  depends 
on the real wage that workers receive; if the wage is low, hardly the worker offers effort. So the effort 
increase only if the real wage increases20 the curve flattens out because there is a part of effort which 
doesn’t depend by the real wage. Firms will choose to pay the real wage that achieves the highest 
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2.6.1 The introduction of minimum wage in efficiency wage model: diagram and 
interpretation. 
 
 The following diagram shows  what happens if we introduce a minimum wage(higher) in the 





 As we can see workers working at WE and will not put so much effort per dollar as worker receiving 
W *. So if we take into account the efficiency-wage model employees pay a wage equal to w because 
workers will be more productive.  But this model has some implications as, for example that 
employment only varies when MPN* curve shifts and as we discussed before real wage is determined 
only by effort curve.  
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2.6.2 Heterogeneous labor model. 
 
 Heterogeneous labor model instead is recently integrated into minimum wage analysis. Usually low 
wage groups are formed also by relatively skilled and better paid worker, often doing the same tasks 
and which are not affected by the minimum wage. That one are used as substitute of that worker 
directly affected by the minimum wages, causing  a decline in overall employment but led to a wrong 
conclusion that the balance of overall unemployment effect of minimum wage may  be very small. 
 
2.6.3   Effort model. 
     
The last model is the effort one. It is a variant of the traditional model.  The final conclusion of this 
model can be summarized in the following way:                                                           
-Initially a minimum wage reduces employment however it led to a competition among workers 
decreasing the low-rent marginal worker out of the market.                                   
At the end  all this erodes the rent conferred by the minimum wage to low-rent workers and increase 
the value of marginal product, so if the minimum wage led to  more money income on low-skilled 
worker, it has little effect in rent to a worker, employment, total output and firm profits.   
 
2.6.4 Should minimum wage be increased or decreased? 
 
The model on minimum wage which have realistic hypothesis (as for example the monopolistic power 
of firms) admit that the minimum wage fixing is an issue of fine-tuning: in fact, if it is fixed at a very 
low level, it loses its functions, but vice versa, if it is fixed at a very high level, we can have worst 
results of monopsony because total surplus would be less than its amount in the absence of minimum 
wage. Some studies tend to  confirm that   a decrease of minimum wage could  give the opportunity 
to some less productive workers(as young  and not-qualified workers) to   get a job; this can be 
considered definitively  true in economies with very high unemployment rate for same categories(as 
can be young people).  On the other way, some economists tend to  be agree with an increasing of the 
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minimum wage because of some group of workers tend to be less influent than other during 
collective agreements, increasing inequality. In this context, minimum wage has to be understood as 
an instrument to reduce poverty. Obviously, this theory has found very support in the part of 




2.7 Economic literature about minimum wage.  
 
 Economic literature on minimum wage is very vast; for example Newark and Washer (2004 and 2008) 
provide an in-depth review on the field, which continues to be characterized on how minimum wages 
affect employment in general and also for youth.  Although early research on the topics consists of a 
mixture of a case studies and state panel estimation, recent research tends   towards the latter, 
generally using time period fixed effect, geography-specific linear time trends, and geography-
clustered standard errors. In addition, recent empirical specification includes covariates that capture 
non-linear difference and difference in local climates. For example Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) use a 
broad of a set of business cycle controls(in addition to dummy time-series) to account for differing  
economic environments  across states and over time; then they find no adverse effect of the 
minimum wage on the employment, but above all for  less-educated adult. Taking this step further, 
Allegretto and All (2011) demonstrate substantial heterogeneity in employment patterns across 
regions of the U.S and control for this by allowing time period effects to vary by Census Division; they 
find no effect on minimum wage on teenage and youth employment. There are also recent studies 
which have to view state-induced variation as suitable for identifying the employment effect of 
minimum wage laws (e.g. Pedace and Rohn, 2011; Sabia et al, 2012), but partly  to facilitate credible 
identification , the type of data employed in minimum wage research has shifted 21. Historically, 
                                                          
21
 Using the within-state variation still averages change to the federal minimum wage: if the federal minimum wage floor 
increases, this effectively acts as a “negative” treatment to the wage differential between states that already use a super-
federal minimum wage (and leave it unchanged) and those for whom the federal minimum binds. In my opinion Baskaya 
and Rubeinstein (2011) use and interesting approach, due to the fact that they use a hybrid approach. They allow the 
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nearly every minimum wage analysis use individual-level (survey) micro data samples, but there are 
also recent research that use administrative data as the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW), provided by the Bureau Labor of Statistic. In addition, Addision at all (2009) use these data 
on the county-level population of retail employee and find little evidence of not employment effects. 
Also during county-level data in the QCEW, Dube et al 2010 compare contiguous counties across state 
lines and in the same way they find no effect from minimum wage differential. Then, of course, there 
are very recent studies which apply novel techniques to this question. For example, Sabia et al (2012) 
created a synthetic(in the sense of experiment) control for New York to study how the state’s recent 
minimum wage increases affected low-wage teenagers and young; so estimating a large and 
significantly negative employment elasticity  on minimum wage. A very important exception is the 
work made by Dube ET all (2011). In fact he examined the relationship between minimum wage and 
employee turnover using the Quarterly Workforce Indication (QWI), focusing on youth restaurant 
employee, and using a short panel of contiguous across state lines; found that the minimum wage 
reduced both new hiring and separations despite having little effect on employment levels.  As 
mentioned above, the difference in features characteristics of “the national minimum wage research” 
is characterized by a shift away from a reliance on time-series variation in minimum wages towards 
the use of cross-sectional or panel data to identify the employment effects of minimum wage laws. 
This change was motivated by  the fact that the using  of time-series evidence on minimum wage 
effects give us important limitations, also because  there have been relatively few legislated minimum 
wage changes. Another relatively advantages is that using cross- sectional or panel data to study the 
minimum wage effect it  may provide potentially valuable information on how the minimum wages 
interact with other labor market policy( as we are will see to see after)  that could be directly or 
indirectly associated with the minimum wage. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
variation of the minimum wage levels to determine the potential of each state of change to the federal minimum wage, 
and then instrument for these “minimum wage gap” in a structural model using a political ideology. Finally they find that 
minimum wage have significant not employment effect for youth and teenagers, but only when accounting for this 





2.7.1    Setting minimum wage.  
 
The economic and labor law suggests that employment effect depends also by economic and 
institutional context, the method of setting of the minimum wage and also by the role of labor market 
policies. In this case some recent studies regarding China from 2000 to 2005 found no overall effect 
on employment, with negative employment effect on only two regions. In the same way there are the 
same results also for Indonesia and Brazil.  In more detail way, Suryahadi ET all also found that a 10 
per cent increase of the minimum wage would reduce employment by 1.2 per cent.  However, by the 
effect it is not so clear: in fact a very interesting and also recent study about Indonesia shows that a 
minimum wage increase was associated with a net increase in total (both formal and informal) 
employment22.  
 
2.7.2 The Macroeconomic impact of the minimum wage.  
 
 The overall macroeconomic impact of a minimum wage depends not only on how it effects 
consumption and investment, but also on how it affects competitiveness and whether it affects net 
export. If we consider the policy of increasing minimum wage which was actuated in such countries 
Latin America Economies, it led to an increase of consumption but also in investment and growth23. In 
some of these economies the minimum wage paid a key role in the creation of middle class which 
before was insistent, so creating a room for autonomous growth and enhancing social cohesion.  All 
this means above all reduction of inequality, in the sense of redistribution of income to low-paid 
worker and then, power of consume and investment. In Indonesia, for example, minimum wage 
together with other polices led to an increase of equality at the bottom end of wage distribution; in 
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 Comola and De Mello 2009 
23
 ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean).  2012. 
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Brazil instead minimum wage increase led to a greater improvement for middle-income groups than 
for their low-income counterparts24.   
 
2.7.3 The increasing of minimum wage and its impact on employment.  
 
The increasing of minimum wage can also influence average wages. If we take into account the 
evidence from Latin America, an increase of 10 per cent in minimum wage would led to an increase in 
average wage between 1 and 6 per cent (Cunningham, 2007). Unfortunately the greatest debate 
about the minimum wage is the relationship with employment. The most recent literature, in 
particular if we consider microeconomic studies, suggests that in most cases there is only small or no 
negative effect on employment.  This  is also confirmed by two recent studies: one if take into account 
all 64 studies about the impact of minimum wage in United States which confirmed  or not the  
negative effect on employment, while some studies shows as the increase of minimum wage could 
reduce the unemployment  of some categories of worker(low-skilled, and youth).  
 
2.8 The empirical evidence about minimum wage: previous research.  
 
The empirical analysis on minimum wage is carry out mainly by few studies, the first one is that     
made by OECD (1998). It looks at the effect of the minimum wage on employment of teenagers, 
young adults and prime ages adults (age 25-54) for a small sample of countries, from 1975 to 1996.  
The countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United States. However, it is really important to evidence that for gender analysis the sample is 
reduced to seven countries because of the lack of adequate series of average wage for Portugal and 
Spain. The regression fellows the specification used in U.S.A. minimum wage literature; the 
dependent variable is the employment population ratio for youth, teenagers and young adults, while 
for 7 countries reduced specification, two sub-groups is used. The key minimum wage ratio has been 
                                                          
24
 Empirical evidence are based on Chun and Khor (2010) for Indonesia and Lemos (2007 and 2009), from Brazil.  
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calculated using the ratio of the minimum wage to average wage, with controls for business cycle, 
different institutional features (not including LMI), using country and time fixed effect.  The results are 
that minimum wage has a negative impact on teenager’s employment for all type of specifications. In 
the authors preferred specifications with corrections for first-order autocorrelation for the error 
terms and heteroschedasticity across countries – a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage was 
associated with a fall in teenage employment of between 1.5 and 2 (2.7 and 4.1) percent. On the 
other hand, for young adults aged 20 to 24 years and for adult prime age males and females the 
elasticity was seldom statistically significant. However, OECD study doesn’t consider labor market 
institutions (as union density, for example); but it has been done in a pioneer study by Lazear (1990).  
The study by Neumark and Wascher (2004) is very important in this sense because it links minimum 
wage and labor market institutions literature. Specifically, they estimated the effect of the minimum 
wage on teenage and young people using again the employment-population ratio for seventeen OECD 
countries covering the period (1976-2000). In addition to the countries of OECD study, it includes also 
Italy, Australia, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 
The dependent variable is the employment-population ratio for the group concerned the ratio of 
minimum wage to average wage. Their basic equation regress  the employment measure on a one 
year-lag of the minimum-to average wage ratio plus aggregate labor market and demographic 
control. In all cases, the estimated wage elasticity is between -0.13 and -0.28 for young adults and 
from -0.09 to -0.31 in the case of teenagers.  
The authors include estimation also for labor market institutions, focusing mainly on union density 
indicator. Again focusing on the preferred results of GMM estimations, author founds evince of 
certain complementarities.  
Bassanini and Duval (2006), also study minimum wage but considering its relationship with 
unemployment not employment; like the formal approach, they consider the ratio of gross statutory 
minimum wage to median or average wage. Obviously, they also take into consideration Neumark 
and Washer (2004 and 2009)25 , affirming that a few papers combine information on both statutory 
and contractual minimum wage.  However, contractual minimum wage can wary across sector and 
often depend on worker’s age, experience and qualifications; and it is more likely to be quite different 
                                                          
25
  Bassanini and Duval Paper titled: The Determinants of Unemployment across OECD Countries: Reassessing the role of policies 
and institution, OECD Economic Studies No. 42, 2006/, page 21.  
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from those of uniform national minimum wage. For these reasons, being agree with Bassanini, Duval 
and the main thrust of literature, considering that these data are first hardly  available and secondly 
to  be summarized in a one cross country comparable indicator, collective bargaining minima are 
excluded from the scope of this analysis.                                         
Another thing to consider is that nearly all the empirical studies on minimum wage have focused as 
legal minimum wage floor affect the employment level, either for all but also for a restrict type of 
people(as for example, young and teenagers). For example, in a Diamond (1981), the type worker and 
matching framework, an effect on minimum wage should be more transparent in employment 
dynamics. The basic intuition is that while in the short-run the minimum wage effect positively 
employment, it may be act on the job creation margin to alter the long-run rate of bet job growth. For 
sure there are several papers on minimum wage, and above all time series model early 1980 was the 
predominant model. Brown (1999) built a model about the U.S, taking into account a minimum wage 
imposed at both high and low wage, and he finds a negative and significant effect.  However, before 
1980 we had a number of more recent cross-section and panel data in Canada and In the U.S, so a 
different type of approach (Grenier and Sèguin, 1991 for Canada). All these studies seem to suggest 
that the effect of the increase of the minimum wage of the 1980s and 1990s doesn’t seem to be 
negative, and in some cases, can be positive. This type of estimation is more similar to the earlier 
specification, but the difference that we take into account more years together, the clear message is 
that including additional year it reduces the estimated effect of the minimum wage on employment. 
In addition, some authors as Kenan talked on the issue that time series led to a problem due to 
omitted variables and other time series relative problem, so panel data was at time the best method 
of estimation. However, in recent years there have been several studies which were trying to 
underline as OLS time series was robust and so the best way to estimate  So, on balance, these new 
reading, if accepted, would reintegrate the standard text book prediction  of the negative effect of the 






2.8.1 A new method of estimation: “quasi natural experiment”. 
 
However, we have to considered that recent studies consider a  new method of estimation for the 
impact of the minimum wage on  employment in general, and then also for young people. Baker, 
Benjamin and Stranger (1999) had advantage of the unique experiment afforded by the Canadian 
data relative to the U.S, with the aim to estimate the minimum wage effect based on 1973-1995 
sample period. However, they estimate only for teenagers and didn’t disaggregate for gender. They 
found a negative significant minimum wage effect elasticity (-0.25) driven by the low-frequency 
variation data. They affirmed that the dependence of the elasticity to low frequency is that the 
employment dynamics in the minimum wage sectors are not well described by short-run adjustment 
costs, but by explanations that focus on turnover and firms.  Another study, so called natural o “quasi-
natural experiment”, has found insignificant or positive effect, as well as the shortcoming or 















2.9.    Active labor market polices. (ALMP’S) 
 
 
In the last years there has been a growing interest about the issue of active labor market policy. First 
off all there are several interpretations of the active labor market policy; the most used and accepted 
is the following: “measures in order to improve the functioning of the labor market that are directed 
towards unemployed”. So the primary aim of the labor market is to comprise three basic 
subcategories: job broking with the purpose of making the matching process between vacancies and 
job seekers more efficient, labor market training and in order to upgrade and adapt the skills of job 
applicants, and direct job creation, which can be done by either public sector employment or 
subsidization of private-sector work. However, we have to take into account that each type of policy 
can be studied  using several different channels, so in this case will be more useful to build  a simple 
analytic framework in way to understand the crucial determinants of the policy effectiveness.   
2.9.1 ALMP’S in the history.  
 
In several countries ALMP have a long tradition. At the end of XX century employment office was 
opened, and between the two world wars, some programs were actuated to help unemployed. A 
series of different active labor market program and policies were adopted for youth. These included: 
direct employment generation (wage subsides, public works, guaranteed job schemes), employment 
service with the aim to facilitate young people’s transition into the labor market, and skill developed 
program. Primary, we can say that generally we have two types of policies: one regard to promote 
employment, through training, subsides and work placement; another regards that one which can 
help young people to become self-employed. When we talk about job growth we have to take into 
account which it doesn’t come from labor market interventions alone, but also by macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies which should support employment generation through global growth. Growth 
policies encouraging economic diversification and productive transformation through sectorial 
strategies, removing constraints regard private investment above all for small firms. Labor standard 
and social protection for young people can be implemented above all through the quality of jobs; 
there are several young worker which works long hours, in bad condition and not able to go out of 
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their status of poverty.  In this case, wage polices can be very important for both economic and right 
reasons.  All this have to be linked to the fact that several young workers have inadequate social 
protection, also because they worked in not-standard conditions for an employment. So there is a 
need to improve and expand social protection program for young people, with the prospective that 
these social measures have to be understood as investment not as a cost for society. ALMPs also 
include activation, measures that provide incentives for the unemployed to increase job finding either 
directly through benefits sanctions or through mandatory participation in training. Key examples of 
activation program are requirements that unemployed individuals attend intensive interview with 
employment counselors, apply for job vacancy and apply for jobs.   ALMPs policies may eliminate 
mismatch in the labor market, promote more active search behavior on the part of jobseekers, and 
have a screening function because they substitute for regular work experience for reducing 
uncertainty about the employability of job applicants.  
 
 
2.9.2 ALMP’S economic theory. 
 
 In macroeconomics the first analysis of labor market program has been done using the Layard-Nickel 
Model. As we can see from the figure the downward-sloping curve is an employment schedule 
relating employment26 measured as a proportion of the labor force to real wage.  The upward-sloping 
curve instead is wage setting-schedule, where we can see that higher aggregate employment causes 
pressure for higher real wages.  In this case some relationship can be derived; in particular monopoly 
union, efficiency wage and bargaining models. Some researchers believe that union can led to wage 
increase and so causing lay-off, another part believes that employers have to pay more to compete 
for their work forces in some situations.                                                               
One very useful way to explain the measures of the effectiveness of the matching process between 
vacancies and unemployed can be done taking into account the Beverage Curve.    
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 Bc1 curve is slopes downward because in a boom there are many vacancy and few unemployed, 
while in slump there are many unemployed and few vacancies.  Due to the economy cyclical 
fluctuation, the unemployed-vacancy combination moves up Bc1 curve. In a given period could be 
that we have a rate of vacancy equal to V1 and a rate of Unemployed equal to U1. The exact location 
of Beverage curve depends as the labor market efficient is. ALMPs may improve the efficiency of the 
labor market, causing an inward shift of Beverage Curve, for example from U1 to U2. In this case, 
given the same vacancy rate V1, we have an unemployment rate equal to U2.  Boone e van Ours 
(2004) built theoretical model about search-matching in which we have there ALMPs: training of 
unemployed workers, employment incentives and employment public service .The key idea is that the 
workers of public offices help unemployed worker to apply for the best training course for everyone, 
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in way to optimize the number of hours dedicated to the training and above economic resources. In 
this model the employment offices have the key role  to filter the vacancies in way which the work 
seeker take into account only the relevant work for him/her; then they have the key role to reduce 
the search  for the workers.  In this model, ALMPS   have two ways to reduce unemployment. Firstly, 
they can improve the probability to find a vacancy. Second, through training, they can improve not 
only unemployed but also employed to find better jobs in term of wages.  They argument that 
training can effectively improve the employability of the workers, while incentives and employment 
offices can be less efficient; they also affirmed  that  with a higher unemployment benefits can led to 
a more efficient training course and then, more probability to became employed. 27 Boone and Van 
Ours (2006) built a model about the role paid by the sanctions on the performance; a measure to 
improve the probability of work seeks which have unemployment benefits to find a job.  They show as 
the sanctions can influence the period of unemployment in two ways: ex ante and ex post.  Ex ante  
because more rigid requirement to apply for benefits  increase the intensity of job search also for not 
sanctioned worker , ex post because decreasing  unemployment benefits provided, increase the 
intensity of job search  by a sanctioned worker. However, to analyze active labor market policy, we 
have to modify a little bit the both models; because we have to distinguish between participation in 
labor market programs and regular employment. For this reason, employment and wage-setting 
schedules are instead drawn with regular employment (excluding participation programmers). So, in 
that way, the interaction between the employment and wage setting schedules at a now determines 
the rate of regular employment. Also Beverage curve has to be modify, in way that horizontal axis 
measures the total number of job searcher without a regular job, while the vertical axis indicates 
vacancies for regular job.  The “New Beverage Curve” can be very useful to explain the various effects 
of the labor market program. If for example we have an increase of placement in training or job 
creation schemes and nothing else happen, the effect would simply be to reduce open 
unemployment by a corresponding amount. Now we have to underline the role of regular 
employment, in particular how it is affect by the increase of placement in training.  The idea is to 
capture how long the strong is the gross impact on open unemployment, because it could be also 
reinforced or counteracted by the indirect effect. However, we have to underline how we can have 
different effect of active labor  market policies that can be considered as interactive each other, in 
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 Similar result is express by Bassanini and Duval (2006).  
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particular: -effects on labor force participation, -effect on job matching –effects  on the competition in 
the labor market, -substitution effect, work test effects, - productivity effect. General equilibrium tax 
effect and repercussions on other policies. 
 
2.9.3 Policies and institutions: Does a link exist? 
 
 Before moving to analyse empirically data, in this section I am going to present a recent literature 
about these issues. In general:                                                                        
-1) “there are popular positions on the effectiveness of active labor market programs. On one hand, 
proponents of these programs argue that active labor market programs are necessary and useful, 
short only of a panacea for reducing unemployment and protecting workers. Opponents of the 
programs tend to summarily dismiss these programs as a waste of public money a with high 
opportunity costs to other social programs and labor market efficiency as a whole.”(Dar and 
Tzanattos, 1999).                   -
2) However, there is a need to underline as regarding the effects of alternative policies, Bassanini and 
Duval (2006, page 6), argue that...                     
“Change in polices and institutions appear to explain almost two thirds of not cyclical unemployment 
change over the past two decades. …On overage, it is estimated  that a 10 percentage point reduction 
in tax wedge, a 10 percentage point reduction of unemployment benefits and/or decline in product 
market regulation by two standard deviations would be associated with a drop of unemployment rate 
by about 2.8, 1,2 and 0,7 percentage points, respectively.”;                
-3) on active labor market programs, Bectherman, Olivas and Dart (2004, p. 52) observe that “some 
ALMPS do have a positive impact (on unemployment), with favourable cost-benefits ratio. However, 
in many cases, programs have not improved the future employment effect prospects and participants 
and, when they have not always done in so in cost-effective manner. ..Employment service is 
generally the most cost-effective intervention and compared to other ALMP’s are inexpensive. 
Training programs for the unemployed can also have positive impact on employment. These programs 
are most effective when they are workplace based.”                            
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-4) Regarding EPL “most of the individual county studies demonstrate that regulations promoting job 
security…or net reduce employment” (Heckman and Pagès, 2003 p.6).  
Finally, taking into consideration the most recent literature on policy effectiveness, we can affirm 
that:  
-ALMP’S should have a positive impact/effect on labor market outcomes (employment rates);  
-Regulations that either enhance the rigidity of labor market, or that generally   are likely to shift 
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2.10 Theoretical model and econometric specification.  
 
The theoretical model takes into account can be considered as implicit; it is in the spirit of Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (1999) and Coe and Snower (1997). The first offers a dynamic search and matching model 
with negotiation and employment protection, and introduce minimum wage setting into this 
framework to study its impact on job creation and job destruction.  Their model shows that 
employment protection may strongly elevate unemployment of lower skilled workers when the 
minimum wage is high.  Cover and Snowier develop a model of policy complementarities and show 
that policy/institutions that affect bargaining power of incumbent employees, or that influence 
barriers of job creation have complementary effects on unemployment such that minimum-wage like 
measures that cost jobs can be magnified or ameliorated according to the restrictiveness of the ruling 
labor market environment.  
The aim of both models is to capture of minimum wages and labor force characteristics, and imply 
that minima will be less disruptive when policies are less rigid. 
Regarding the econometric specification and the choice of variables, as explained before, we take into 












2.10.1 Main results. 
Baseline regression results are represented in the following table:  
Table 1   




gap   
Fe  including  
gap  
Gmm 
without. gap  
Gmm  
including 
 Gap  
 L1year      0.60** 0.38** 
      (0.27) (0.19) 
Epl  4.24** 2.41 -1.24 -2.37 
  (1.85) (1.56) (1.53) (1.78) 
Union  Density  -0.71*** -0.73** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
  (0.22) (0.37) (0.01) (0.01) 
Minimum wages  -5.89* -8.96* -4.79** -6.38** 
  (3.46) (5.27) (2.40) (3.75) 
Pes  0.23*** 0.2*** 0.11** 0.03*** 
  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Training   -0.3 0.2** 0.10*** 0.17*** 
  (0.3) (0.1) (0.03) (0.05) 
Youth measures  -0.33 -0.08 -0.30 -0.18 
  (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.3) 
Employment Incentives  0.04** 0.05* 0.02** 0.06** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Measures for Disables  -0.04** -0.06** -0.22*** -0.41** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.16) 
Tax wedge  -0.13** -0.2** -0.04** -1.35*** 
  (0.06) (0.11) (0.02) (0.38) 
Coordination  0.5 0.4 0.41 0.79 
  (2.10) (2.10) (1.75) (1.95) 
Youth as % of working age 
population  
-0.61** -0.30** -0.91** -0.95** 
  (0.30) (0.14) (0.42) (0.45) 
Dual  apprenticeship  5.40** 6.10** 15.20** 12.20** 
  (2.55) (2.74) (7.10) (6.10) 
Output Gap    0.20**   0.12** 
    (0.10)   (0.05) 
Cons 52.22 66.76 19.42 55.68 
          
 R squared(within) 0.80 0.85     
          
Country effect  Yes  Yes      
          
Times Effect Yes  Yes      
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Hansen test(pvalue)     1.00 1.00 
          
N of instruments      60 57 
          
Arellano-Bond AR1test      -2.30** -2.45** 
Arellano-Bond AR2test      -0.25 -0.32 
N of observations  476 476 476 476 
 
* ,   **  ,   ***  ,  statistically significant  at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively   
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis, for panel data model It has to be 
considered as clustered standard-error.  
  
      
 
As we can see, panel data with both countries-times fixed effect and GMM  dynamic panel data 
model have been estimated. Furthermore, following Bassanini and Duval (2006), the same 
specification has been estimated two times, one including output gap variable and one without one.   
Starting form panel data with fixed effects, we can affirm that R square within (which indicates the 
variability explain by the model has a very high significance (0.80 and 0.85 for both specifications, so it 
indicates that the model has been specified in good way.                                                   
Analysing results for the first column (fixed effect  without including gap) we can see as several 
variables  have statically significance; in detailed way, an unitary  increase   of EPL  increase youth 
employment rate by 4.24 point percentage(with  five percentage  statically significance).  As expected, 
union density and minimum wage indicators have a negative and significance impact on youth 
employment rate (decreasing it respectively by 0.71 and 5.89 points percentage).                 
A negative effect is also estimate for tax wedge (-0.13 in youth employment rate); however there is a 
need to take into consideration that the measure of tax wedge is derived from OECD tax model and 
therefore only captures labor taxes (social security contributions and labor taxes), but not 
consumption taxes29 ; furthermore also youth percentage as working age population led to an 
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 The source is the OECD Taxing Wage Database (See Bassanini and Duval, Annex 2), which defines it as the wedge 
between labor cost to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee for a single-earner couple 
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decrease of youth employment rate by (0.61 point percentage).  However, a very important role in 
this model has paid by ALMP’S variables. Dummy variable for apprenticeship system is positive and 
also significant (at five per cent; it means that the presence of the apprenticeship system is a valid 
instrument to increase youth employment rate (5, 40 points percentage). Several additionally ALMP’S 
variables  have significance: Employment incentives(holding constant other variables) led to an 
increase of youth employment rate by 0.04 point percentage; a stronger effect is given by public 
employment services, which led to an increase of youth employment rate by 0.24 with a five per cent 
of statistically significance. Also the variable which measures active labor polices for disables is 
statistically significant at 5 per cent, so it implies that an increase (in percentage) of measures for 
disability led to a decrease of youth employment rate by 0.04 points percentage. The second column, 
including also output gap,  shows the same results( considering statistically  significance); furthermore  
we have to consider  that  also the additional variable has  statistically significance( at 5 per cent); 
meaning  an increase  of youth employment rate by 0.20  points percentage. Considering other 
variables, we can say that: dual apprenticeship dummy continues to have a positive impact/effect on 
youth employment rate (6.10 points percentage); the same is for minimum wages and for other 
ALMP’S indicators. The only variable which loses statistically significance is EPL one, also if it is always 
positive. On the other hand, training variable becomes statistically significance at 5 per cent, so as 
expected, an increase of one point percentage in training variable led to an increase of youth 
employment rate by 0.20 points percentage.                                                                                                    
To sum up, in the second column the variables maintain the same significance and sign of the first 
one, but, additionally, also output variable has statistically significance, and considering that R square 
is also improved, we can say that  it can be considered preferred to the first one because it better 
specifies/ explains   the model.                                                   
Third and fourth columns represent generalized method moments for dynamic panel data (GMM). As 
explained before, Bassanini and Duval didn’t use this type of econometrics specification in their 
paper30; it is very useful technique because GMM estimators are knows to be consistent, 
asymptotically normal and efficient in the class of estimators that don’t use extra information aside 
from that contained in the moment conditions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
with two children earning 100% of APW earnings. The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal income tax and social 
security contributions as a percentage of total labor cost.  
30
 Or at least for this specification.  
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The advantages of GMM estimators are that: 
-1) it doesn’t require hypothesis on the distribution of the observations,  
-2) it admits heteroscedasticity (form unknown);  
-3) it permits to estimate parameters also if the model cannot be analytically resolved starting of first 
order condition.                                                           
In this model, a very important role is paid by Hansen test and by Autocorrelation test (AR1 and AR2). 
Technically speaking, it has been estimated using xtandond2 command offered by STATA 12 Software; 
it is a very useful command because it permits, regarding instruments, the limits of lags which have to 
be included. If t id fairly large (more than 7-8, so this is the case), an unrestricted set of lags will 
introduce a huge number of instruments, with a possible loss of efficiency. So, in this case a lag limit 
options has been included; specifying that only lags 2-5 have to be used in constructing Gmm system. 
Furthermore, following previous literature, minimum wage has been considered as endogenous.        
As we can see, this model   tends   to confirm previous results (and then literature): in both 
specifications union density as a negative impact on youth employment rate (also if the effect is less 
strong than panel data model); minimum wage continues to have a strong, strong and statistically 
significance impact on dependent variable (with same strong; 4.79 in the specification without gap 
and 6.38 including it), the lagged dependent variable is also significant at five per cent. Considering 
both estimates (without and with gap), a strong result is given by dual apprenticeship dummy.  In the 
first model, its presence implies an increase of youth employment rate by 15, 20 per cent, while in the 
second one, it led an increase by 12, 20 points percentage (it is a very strong result considering that 
panel data with both fixed effect has given a positive and statistically significant but not including this 
intensity). A difference can be seen also considering the estimates including gap for tax wedge 
variable.  Also if it has been also statistically significant and with negative sign in all previous 
estimates, however, as dual apprenticeship dummy, in the last it effect is become stronger.                                                                                                                                     
However, we cannot really understand the fit of model if we don’t evaluate the test expressed before: 
Jansen test and Autocorrelation/s test.                                                                                               
Starting from Jansen Test, firstly  it  requires that the number of moment conditions be greater than 
the number of parameters in the model, its aim is  to verify the null hypothesis of over-identification( 
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it has a chi-squared distribution). Accepting the null hypothesis of over-identification as we have to do 
in both estimates), we can conclude that the model (as instrumental variable use), has been specified 
in good way.  Now next step is to evaluate Autocorrelation-test(s), the number 1 and 2 indicate the 
first difference errors at first and second order.             
When the heteroskedasticity  errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d), the first-
differenced errors are first-order serially correlated. So, as expected, the output for both model 
present strong evidence against the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
errors at an order 1. Serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order higher than 1 implies 
that the moment’s conditions used is not valid. However, in our case, both models present no 
significance evidence against serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at order 2.  
2.11 Interactions between policies and institutions.  
 
In a standard wage setting/price setting (WS PS) model31  has been showed that institutions interact 
with each other in their impact on aggregate employment/unemployment.  Such interactions can be 
summarized in two mechanisms:                                                           
-First, policies and institutions that can affect wage and/or elasticity of demand (bargaining power, 
EPL, the tax wedge), interact between policies and institutions (as for example unemployment 
benefits).                                                                                                                                                                       
-Second, the marginal impact on labor demand of a given change in real wages is likely to larger when 
employment rate is already high than it is low.                                                              
The overall explanation that emerges from theoretical explanations is that   virtually all possible 
interactions between policies and institutions can influence employment rate and that also if such 
interactions imply reform complementarities should be assessed on the basis of empirical evidence.   
In this case, the choice has been to estimate more common interactions previously estimate in 
literature; as the interaction between employment protection legislation and minimum wage, and 
coordination and minimum wage. So, the next step is to estimate these interactions to better 
understand their role/effect and impact on employment (youth) rate. 
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Dependent Variable: Youth Employment Rate including also interactions between policies and institutions  
Variables 
Fe without 
gap   






 Gap  
 L1year      0.62** 0.42** 
      (0.29) (0.21) 
Epl  4.31** 7.53*** -1.30 -2.60 
  (2.20) (1.01) (1.70) (1.90) 
Union  Density  -0.71*** -0.35* -0.03*** -0.03*** 
  (0.22) (0.20) (0.01) (0.01) 
Minimum wages  -5.27 -8.96* -6.51** -8.82** 
  (3.10) (5.70) (3.10) 4.20 
Pes  0.14*** 0.17*** 0.15** 0.03*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.01) 
Training   -0.3 0.2** 0.10*** 0.17*** 
  (0.3) (0.1) (0.03) (0.05) 
Youth measures  -0.33 -0.10 -0.35 -0.18 
  (0.29) (0.27) (0.40) (0.3) 
Employment Incentives  0.04** 0.05* 0.02** 0.10** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 0.05 
Measures for Disables  -0.04** -0.06** 0.5*** -0.41** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.16) 
Tax wedge  -0.22** -0.2** -0.10** 1.01** 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) (0.45) 
Coordination  0.7 0.4 0.41 0.70 
  (2.50) (2.10) (1.75) (2.50) 
Youth as % of working age population  1.21** -0.30** -1.11** -0.95** 
  (0.50) (0.14) (0.50) (0.45) 
Dual  apprenticeship  5.40** 6.10** 17.34** 15.54** 
  (2.55) (2.74) (8.10) (7.03) 
Output Gap    0.20**   0.12** 
    (0.10)   (0.05) 
Epl* Minimum wage  -6.30** -6.51** -8.61** -9.76** 
  (2.93) (3.10) (4.10) (4.54) 
coord*Minimum wage  2.20 2.60 -4.50 -4.60 
  (1.90) (1.80) (3.24) (3.35) 
Cons 60.03 66.76 19.42 25.65 
          
 R squard(within) 0.82 0.87     
          
Country effect  Yes  Yes      
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Times Effect Yes  Yes      
          
Hansen test(pvalue)     1 1 
          
N of instruments      60 57 
          
Arellano-Bond AR1test      -2.40** -2.51 
Arellano-Bond AR2test      -0.34 -0.40 
N of observations  476 476 476 476 
 
 
* ,   **  ,   ***  ,  statistically significant  at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively   
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis, for panel data model It has to be 




As we can see, after including interactions, the number of variables significant is the same (without 
considering the level). Also signs remain the same for all variables, so it means that model has been 
correctly specified. So, comments will concentrate on the evidence given by interactions variables. In 
this sense, there is a need to underline as only minimum wage*epl interaction variable is significant.  
This means that a unitary increase of this variables, led a decrease of youth employment rate from 





2.12 Estimates for young male and female.  
 
After estimating for youth, the next step has been to estimate the same regression model (including 
also interactions) considering separately male and female groups. The aim   has been to understand if 
trying to control for gender we have different estimations/results.      




















The following table regard male, and we have these results:  
Table 3 




gap   






 Gap  
 L1year      0.96*** 0.90*** 
      (0.05) (0.06) 
Epl  9.09*** 11.55* 3.88* 5.70** 
  (4.23) (6.23) (2.10) (2.46) 
Union  Density  -0.81*** -0.77** -0.10** -0.10** 
  (0.25) (0.39) (0.04) (0.04) 
Minimum wages  -5.94** -6.37** -7.73* -9.35** 
  (2.97) (3.25) 4.25 4.60 
Pes  0.10** 0.15** 0.15** 0.12* 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Training   -0.28 -0.34 0.06** 0.04** 
  (0.5) (0.3) (0.03) 0.02 
Youth measures  -0.31 0.45 0.75 0.90 
  (0.50) (0.61) (0.80) (0.85) 
Employment Incentives  0.19** 0.19** 0.10** 0.10** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) 
Measures for Disables  -0.28*** -0.13** -0.15*** -0.20* 
  (0.08) 0.06 (0.05) (0.11) 
Tax wedge  -0.69* -0.68* -0.28* -0.35*** 
  (0.38) (0.37) (0.16) (0.10) 
Coordination  0.8 0.8 1.84* 2.27** 
  (2.50) (2.50) (1.07) (1.18) 
Youth as % of working age 
population  
-1.61** -1.61** -0.49* -0.69 
  (0.75) (0.75) (0.26) (0.39) 
Dual  apprenticeship  19.09* 21.87* 29.16* 29.7* 
  (10.61) (12.15) (16.20) (16.52) 
Output Gap    0.20**   0.36* 
    (0.10)   (0.20) 
Epl* Minimum wage  -7.58** -8.39** -7.70* 8.00* 
  (3.61) (3.80) 4.28 4.40 
coord*Minimum wage  5.05 5.21 -3.66* -3.66** 
  (3.32) (3.30) (1.69) (1.69) 
Cons 22.65 52.65 17.82 20.14 
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 R squard(within) 0.76 0.80     
          
Country effect  Yes  Yes      
          
Times Effect Yes  Yes      
          
Hansen test(pvalue)     1 1 
          
N of instruments      60 57 
          
Arellano-Bond AR1test      -2.10** -2.35** 
Arellano-Bond AR2test      -0.10 0.12 




* ,   **  ,   ***  ,  statistically significant  at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively   
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis, for panel data model It has to be 







 A general consideration is that changing the dependent variable (youth male for youth) the results 
don’t change.  
However, there is a need to underline that we can have also   cases with   better results: it is the case 
of EPL which is always positive for all models considered including all type of specifications (from 3.88 
to 11.55 per cent, also if with different level of significance). A very positive result is given by 
“coordination” variable because it is always positive but(considering GMM model), it  has also 
statistically significant(at five per cent); it means that  unitary (percentage) increase of coordination 
led to an increase of youth employment rate(for male) respectively by 1.84 and 2.27 points 
percentage . Union density also in this estimates is always negative and significant (as expected and 
obtained in previous estimates), considering a range from 0.10 to 0.81; the same is also for minimum 
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wage   also if in this case additionally we have always at least 10 per cent of statistically significance 
The range of minimum wage estimates (from 5.34 to 9.35)   is the same of previous estimates. 
Considering ALMP’S, also in this case estimates seem to confirm previous ones; “youth measure” 
variable is not significant, while employment incentives is always significant (at five per cent of 
significance level), with a range from 0.19 to 0.10. Dual apprenticeship system would seem to lose  
statistically significance , but however results are still good; additionally the value for all four 
estimates is  very high(while in the previous ones it happens only considering GMM model); so it 
would mean that dual apprenticeship system  could increase employment rate for young male by  
19.9-29.7 points percentages.    Now we can start to analyse  what interactions estimates suggest: a 
preliminary comment  is that also in this estimates the  epl*minimum wage variable interaction is 
significant(at five or ten points  percentage); it means that a unitary increase(in percentage) of this  
variable led to an decrease of male youth employment  rate by  7.58-8.00 points percentage; the 
other interaction variable doesn’t have statistical significant(as it was for previous estimates).  The 
last step now is to understand if the model continues to have a good specification: for panel data with 
country fixed effect, r squared percentage is good; so it means that the model is still specified in a 
good way; regarding the GMM model, Hansen test and Arellano Bond test (1-2) for autocorrelation, 
seem to confirm that the GMM model has been specified in a good way. As explained before, also for 
this case the model has been built taking into consideration which minimum wage variable has been 
considered as instrumental variables.                
Next step now is to understand if for female we have different results; the following table give us 









Table 4  
 
 
 Dependent Variable: Female Youth Employment rate. 
Variables Fe without gap   






 Gap  
 L1year      0.90*** 0.90*** 
      (0.06) (0.06) 
Epl  7.00** 12.68** 1.36* 2.68* 
  (3.22) (5.25) (0.81) (1.49) 
Union  Density  -0.64*** -0.81** -0.08*** -0.10*** 
  (0.19) (0.38) (0.02) (0.03) 
Minimum wages  -9.11* -9.63** -10.92** -10.23** 
  (5.02) (4.50) 5.20 (5.01) 
Pes  0.10** 0.14** 0.07* 0.08** 
  (0.05) 0.07 (0.04) (0.04) 
Training   0.06** 0.06** 0.04** 0.04** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Youth measures  0.80 0.70 0.75 0.90 
  (0.65) (0.60) (0.45) (0.70) 
Employment Incentives  0.02 (0.22)** 0.09* 0.10** 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) 
Measures for Disables  -0.11 -0.63 -0.15*** -0.15*** 
  (0.11) (0.64) (0.03) (0.03) 
Tax wedge  -0.51* -0.61* -0.23 -0.21** 
  (0.28) (0.34) (0.70) (0.10) 
Coordination  0.75 0.75 1.84* 1.84* 
  (2.64) (2.64) (1.07) (1.07) 
Youth as % of working age 
population  
-4.30* -6.06* -0.49* -0.49** 
  (2.39) (3.10) (0.26) (0.23) 
Dual  apprenticeship  15.48* 18.41* 26.27* 21.87* 
  (8.60) (10.23) (14.20) (12.10) 
Output Gap    0.45**   0.30** 
    (0.20)   (0.14) 
Epl* Minimum wage  4.29 -9.9* -1.25 -9.39* 
  (5.23) (5.50) (4.50) (5.22) 
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coord*Minimum wage  5.15 5.20 -0.48 -2.47 
  (3.40) (3.50) (0.91) (1.74) 
Cons 7.08 10.25 15.37 7.08 
          
 R squard(within) 0.70 0.75     
          
Country effect  Yes  Yes      
          
Times Effect Yes  Yes      
          
Hansen test(pvalue)     1 1 
          
N of instruments      60 57 
          
Arellano-Bond AR1test      -2.01** -2.15** 
Arellano-Bond AR2test      -0.90 -0.95 
N of observations  476 476 476 476 
 
* ,   **  ,   ***  ,  statistically significant  at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively   
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis, for panel data model It has to be 





 The following results would seem to confirm the theory which female (also youth) really have much 
more difficulties than man to get a job.  This has been immediately confirmed analysing values of dual 
apprenticeship variables: it clearly confirmed which the presence of   dual apprenticeship system of 
course increase female youth employment rate, but less than male one. The same can be understood 
if we analyse minimum wage variable; in this case a unitary increase of this variable leads to a 
decrease of youth employment rate for female more than man.  It happens also if we consider EPL 
variable, its unitary increase led to an increase of female youth employment rate which is less than 
male one (it is confirmed in 3 estimates of 4). The same information is given by youth cohort; a 
unitary increase led to a decrease of female youth employment rate by 6.06-0.49 point’s percentages. 
Considering  other variables, the general idea is that  the  significant ones  continue to have statistical  
meaning, however training becomes significant for all four estimates(while for male it was only for 
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two),  and coordination  as for male  confirms its statistical significance. The same consideration has 
to be done also for interacted variables: as previous estimates, only the one regarding EPL and 
minimum wage has statistical significance, while the other one confirms that it doesn’t have statistical 
meaning.  The last step now is to analyse the value of two model: for panel data r square confirm that 
the variability explained by the model is enough to consider it specified in good way; regarding the 
GMM model the tests to analyse are always the same (Hansen Test and Arellano Bond Test); also in 
this case they suggest the model is specified in good way. (Respectively 1 in both cases for Hansen 






















2.13 Conclusion.  
 
This chapter was born with the aim to analyze youth employment issue.  The first questions which I 
asked myself were: What influence youth employment rate? Why is youth employment rate so 
critical?  Answering this questions, at the same time I was writing this chapter.                                                                                                                                     
There are mainly three components which influence youth employment rate: minimum wage, labor 
market policies and institutions. Several papers have been written about these ones, however, not all 
included interactions between them. Result differs in base of econometric assumptions considered. 
My choice (according with my supervisor) has been to investigate these topics considering OECD 
countries, using a panel method of estimation but including also a dynamic one: the results tend to 
confirm previous ones based on panel data method considering minimum wage increase as negative 
instrument for youth employment. Considering labor market institutions, their impact depends by 
which one we consider: union density confirms its negative impact on youth employment rate, while 
on the other hand EPL variable using OECD definition confirms its positive effect on youth 
employment.  ALMP’S have a great influence on  youth employment rate, several variables are 
positive and significant, while other variable included in the model only in part confirms previous  
literature.                                                                                                                                                                            
The last part of the second chapter ends with a little discussion about gender discrimination in the 
issue of youth employment too. As results show, also if the sign of the variable is always the same 
(confirming both literature and the goodness of the model), however the magnitude tends to be 
stronger (in negative meaning), for female estimates.                                                                           
   





Chapter 3 : Estimating the impact of minimum wage on youth employment 
elasticity: a meta-analysis of data including publication bias.  
 
In last decades economic field has been characterized by an expansion of research publication and an 
increasing of information and literature review linked. Some researchers started to analyze mountains 
of paper with the aim to find research with contradictory results. Using a particular statistical 
technique, called meta-analysis, we will able to have an estimation regarding the real “effect”, so 
contributing to clarify the issue in the literature. This  is a crucial point  also  regarding the impact of 
the minimum wage on youth employment elasticity; so in this way we will  able to give a very 
important contribute regarding  this very debated topic/issue.  
                  
3.1 Meta-Analysis.  
 
Meta-analysis is a statistical combination of several and independent studies.  This is defined as a way 
to make the best use of all information we have from a systematic or narrative review. Instead of the 
usual practice to analyzing observations of individual workers/paper, with meta-analysis each paper 
represents an individual point. Alternative definition of Meta-analysis considers it as a body of 
statistical methods that have been found so useful in reviewing and evaluating empirical research 
results. There are several advantages to Using meta-analysis; one of these is that it implies a meta-
study narrative/systematic review that allows often a qualitative assessment of the literature in the 
same way as an “econometrician would write a survey”. All different approaches can be taking into 
consideration: all methodological features of a particular and original analysis can be used as control 
variables in the Meta regression analysis; this is a crucial point because the regression coefficient 






3.1.1 Systematic vs. narrative review approach.  
 
A systematic (review) can be defined as a review that is conducted according to clearly stated, 
scientific research methods, and it is designed to minimize biases and errors inherent to traditional, 
narrative reviews.”32. It is an investigation to develop theory, establishing evidence and solving 
problem. Reviewing evidence, and synthesizing findings, is very common during our ordinary lives.  
For example, when we decide to buy a car, the first question is: Which car shall I buy? However, we 
have to take into consideration the fact that this question implies other ones as: What cars are 
available? What type of car do I need? Which car will make me happy?  All this means gather data in 
way to take the best solution.  Some people do it for us, so we buy car magazine, read online reviews, 
but we also talk to people we know, visit car showrooms and take some cars out for a test drive.  So, 
in this way, we are critically reviewing the evidence we have gathered (including our personal 
experience) and identify possible reason for doubting the veracity of individual claims. We may give 
priority to such characteristics, such as reliability or boot space, etc. This is only one of several 
examples for understanding what it means   do a systematic review. Starting our product research by 
relying first on what other people have written gives us access to a wide range of ideas about how to 
judge cars.  Our “decision question” drives what we are doing (Which car shall I Buy?)And the other 
entire question has the aim to give an answer to this question. Narrative review instead can be 
defined as an “evidence-round ups” on a specific topic, but it doesn’t necessarily follow systematic 
evidence-based criteria. Narrative reviews often do not meet important criteria to help mitigation 
bias, in several  cases it lacks  explicit criteria  for article a selection and frequently there is no 
evaluation of selected articles for validity;  there is a   high potential for low methodological quality. 
However, narrative reviews can be useful for summarizing the literature and providing guidance, but 
as explained before it has not been considered to draw conclusion on the effect.                                 
Then, to sum up, systematic review seeks to clearly formulated question (Which car shall I buy?) by 
using rigorous, explicit protocols to identify, select and appraise relevant research studies, and to 
collect and analyze data from the selected studies. To minimize bias, systematic includes or excludes 
evidence on the basis on explicit criteria, while narrative review may be evidence based, but it is not 
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based on research. It usually lacks systematic search protocols or explicit criteria for selecting and 
appraising evidence.  Differences between systematic and narrative review are several. The first one 
is that systematic one investigates a clearly defined topic or question, while narrative review intends 
to provide an overview of an area. Another difference is that   systematic literature is   gathered using 
explicit search protocols while narrative doesn’t work in this way; furthermore in systematic review 
studies are selected using a protocol that specifies inclusion and exclusion criteria, while in narrative it 
doesn’t happen. The last difference  is that  when  in systematic review evidence is lacking, the 
authors usually recommend further research; while in narrative review make recommendation based 
on their opinion and experience. Recommendations may be “graded” based on the consistency and 
strength of the underlying evidence.                                                                                
So, for all explained before, systematic review is favorite and more useful to the aims of meta-
analysis.   
                            
3.2 Aim of Meta-Analysis.  
 
The aim of statistical combination is to improve the precision of our estimates. The decision about 
which results to include in meta-analysis is a focal point influencing also the validity of the result.  
3.2.1 Meta-analysis as part of research process.  
 
The role of Meta-Analysis is to synthesize the available evidence for a given question.  But Meta-
Analysis, as Systematic Review, can be also part of the research process. This point was underline by 
Ian Chalmers (2007) 33  that affirmed as the meta-analysis is also useful to design the study. In fact it 
may also show that in prior studies one outcome index is more sensitive than other, and should be 
used in the planning study as well. 
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3.3 Meta-analysis use: theory and practice.  
 
Considering last two decades, there have been hundreds of Meta-analyses studies in the field of 
medical and social sciences, always considering area with controversy results. Many examples regard 
clinical trial of the new drugs and medical treatments. Furthermore, it has been defined as the most 
efficient user of experimental data; for example for several times streptokinase has long been 
investigated as a potential treatment of heart attacks for its disability to dissolve blood clots. For two 
decades, randomized trial were undertaken without any clear recommendation, until three meta-
analysis were published, and “Although  the results of the individual clinical trials had been 
contradictory and unreliable, all three meta-analysis found that when the trials were combined, they 
showed that the clot-dissolving agents almost certainly reduced the risk of death by a considerable 
margin34”. 
3.3.1 Debate on its use. 
 
Some medical, as some economist, initially didn’t use meta-analysis, due to the mixing of that can be 
consider as “good” or “bad”. But, with the pass of the time, and above with the encouragement of the 
American Statistical Association, it becomes so widespread, also if initially only for small studies.  Its 
diffusion was due to the clarification role had in some controversial area of research, as for example  
in  establish a connection between exposure to TV violence and aggressive behavior 35, the risk of 
second smoke and the effectiveness of spending more money on school.  Considering economics 
field, some example of meta-analysis regarding union wage premium (Jarrel and Stanley), Minimum 
wage effect (Card and Kruger), and gender wage gap (Stanley and Jar ell).  
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 3.4 Meta-analysis: procedures and methods in previous analyses. 
 
 
Meta-analyses in economics have to be cope with several problems that depend by the increasing and 
the nature of data used in econometric analysis, reporting method used by academic researchers and 
journal. But, as explained before, it is not the only problem that we could have: a potential biases is 
possible due by the selection and publication in primary studies 36 . All these problems include 
heteroskedasticity, heterogeneity, outliers, dependence of estimates, and publication bias. Card and 
Krueger (1995) were the first to use a Meta -analysis for wage studies. In particular, in this paper was 
presented a Meta -analysis of the published time series literature. The basic assumptions was that 
there were some studies (mainly the last one in that period), that were be able to collect more 
observations that early ones.  They collect relatively few studies (15, and 12 were selected). The first 
result that they find was that t ratios reported in different studies were negatively correlated with the 
underlined sample sizes. In addition, the estimated employment effect tended to be about twice its 
standard error, regardless of the size of the standard error. They concluded that time series literature 
may have been affected by a combination of specification searching and publication bias, leading to a 
tendency for statistically significant results to be overrepresented in published literature. They used a 
Meta regression model in which log of t ratio for each studies were the dependent variable, while 
explanatory variables were log of square root of degree of freedom, dummy for auto regression 
correction, sub-sample for teenagers and logarithmic specification. However, the key independent 
variable was the log of the square of the degree of freedom, which was predicted to have a 
coefficient equal to 1 by sampling theory.   In 2010 Bookcmann provides a  meta-analysis of 55 
empirical studies estimating the employment effect of minimum wage in 15 industrial countries. The 
paper strongly confirmed that the notion of the minimum wages is heterogeneous between 
countries. As possible sources of heterogeneity it considered the benefit replacement ratio, 
employment protection and the collective bargaining system. He concluded that while the results 
were in line with theoretical explanations, the degree to which they were robust differed across these 
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institutions. This study followed the influence by Card and Krueger, the central theme underlined was 
that the effects of particular regulations as for example mandatory of minimum wages were likely to 
depend on a country’s wider institutional setting, as well as on norms, macroeconomic conditions and 
other circumstances. Most of the studies in that paper used either regression techniques or quasi 
experimental difference in differences (DID) method; all using micro and aggregate data. Regarding 
the empirical model, he used a probit ordered model for meta-analysis.  An important group on 
independent   variables was which ones related to labor market regulation in the country for which 
the study was conducted; they were constant for countries and year and relate to the late 1990s, 
corresponding to the average wage of the observation period of the studies included in the analysis. 
Being a probit order model, the dependent variable was a code, divided in four arbitrary categories 
(significantly negative 5% level, insignificantly negative, insignificantly positive, significantly positive 
5%). The three institutional variables included to capture interactions with other regulations have 
influenced the estimated employment effect of the minimum wage in plausible ways. At the end he 
concluded that while estimated effects appear plausible, their robustness is not beyond doubt. It was 
due by the fact that the number of studies available at the moment didn’t permit more detailed 
analysis. Another most important meta-analysis on Minimum wage Research was conducted by 
Doucoliagos and Stanley (2009). Their work was so much discussed because they affirmed that Card 
and Krueger confused publication selection with the absence of genuine empirical effect. 
Furthermore, they affirmed that minimum wage effect literature was contaminated by publication 
selection bias; in their opinion, once this publication bias has been corrected, little or no evidence of a 
negative association between minimum wage and employment remained. The key research questions 
were also if new method of meta-analysis could find publication selection and whether meaningful 
minimum wage employment affects remains after likely publication selection, it is filtered from this 
research literature. However, the funnel plot was so difficult to analyze/interpret   because there 
were so few estimates. Regarding meta-analysis estimation, they estimated using the Card and 
Krueger’s model, affirming that when all studies are selected for statistical significance, publication 
selection bias will be proportional to the standard error. Their conclusion were that, no evidence of 
genuine adverse employment effect can be found among time-series estimates of minimum wage 
elasticity used by Card and Krueger, but they contained a clear indication of publication selection. 
Their results find strong evidence of publication selection for significantly negative employment 
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elasticity but no evidence of a meaningful adverse employment effect when selection effects were 
filtered from research record. For them, two scenarios were consistent with this empirical research 
method: first simply that minimum wage may don’t have effect on employment. If this affirmation 
would be true, it would mean that the conventional neoclassic labor model is not adequate with U.S 
Labor Market (especially for teenagers).Secondly, they affirmed that labor minimum wage might 
exist, but is could be very small; but considering 64 studies and 1500 estimates, they “have reason to 
believe that if there is some adverse employment effect from minimum-wage raises, it must be of a 
small and policy- irrelevant magnitude37” 
 
3.5 Present meta-analysis: procedures and methods.  
 
First of all, the first step of this meta-analysis has been to select paper which focused their attention 
on the role/impact of minimum wage on employment (elasticity). The research has been done using 
internet web sites “Google scholar” and repec typing words “minimum wage” and youth employment 
(elasticity)                                                
Paper selected after this step was 250; after there was a need to read all articles in way to understand   
which ones analyzed also youth employment elasticity.  It has been decided to looking for 
employment elasticity and not for youth employment one because in several cases we can have 
different estimations for the same paper, so it would be possible to find youth estimations also in that 
one which not clearly included them.  
3.5.1 Data collection. 
 
It represents the second step of my meta-analysis. It, together with systematic review, is a crucial step 
also because a lot of studies founded in my research, are not so useful for meta-analysis because they 
included also other outcomes potentially influence by minimum wage, such as labor earnings, the 
wage distribution. Dataset consists in all econometric selected studies. A minimum requirement for 
inclusion is that employment effect was econometric estimated. Following previous literature/paper, 
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and also due by their lower power, data resulting by panel data estimates has not been included     An 
important data to take into  consideration   is the country  where  the studies has been conducted, 
also because it will be important to include  as independent variables some labor market institution 
indicators for each relatively country in meta regression. This work has been done from January to 
May 2014; the selected papers were 35(only regarding young people), with 161 estimates on youth 
employment elasticity on minimum wage.  
This table shows a summary of data selected.  
Table 5 
Summary of meta-analysis variables  
 
Specification   Resulta  
Number of estimates  161 
 Publication date  (median) 2000 
Elasticity  (mean) -0.325 
Standard errorr (mean) 0.14 
Number of countries  4 
 
 
3.6 Publication bias.   
 
Publication bias can be defined as the bias in the result of a review due to some research studies 
being more likely to be published38, and thus identified in a review search, than others. The key issue 
is that it is systematic; if the chance of publication was random, with no consistent impact on result 
than it would be less critical.  Publication bias has been identified empirically relatively recently 
through systematic review activity; however it is not a new issue. In fact in 1975, Antony Greenwald 
carried out an empirical investigation regarding some causes of publication bias. In his paper, titled 
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“Consequence of prejudice against the null hypothesis”, he considered all the different points in the 
research process that a systematic bias in favor of positive result might originate. He demonstrated 
that researchers are more likely to investigate problem that  confirm their personal viewpoints, that 
they are more likely to publish positive findings, and that editors are more likely to publish to accept 
paper that report positive findings.                                                                                                                     
So, publication bias means that “even” exhaustive searchers are less likely to find negative and non-
statistically significant findings, and that systematic review affect by publication bias are likely to 
overestimate positive results.  Following Doucouliagos and Stanley Model, we use the most common 
method (but not only this one) to detect publication selection that is funnel plot. The name funnel 
plot is based on the precision in the estimation of the underlying “treatment effect” or “effect size” as 
the sample size of the component studies increases.  
 
 
                    Figure    4 
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Its aim is to analyze publication bias, the association of publication probability with the statistical 
significance of study results.                                                                                                                         
Funnel plots, plots of the studies’ effect estimates on the horizontal axis against sample size in 
ascending order on the vertical axis, is very useful to assess the validity of meta-analyses. It is 
common to plot effect estimates on the horizontal axis and the measure of the study size on vertical 
axis. The name funnel plot “arises” from the fact that precision of the estimated intervention effect 
increases as the size of the study increases. For the purposes of displaying the center of the plot in 
absence of bias, calculation  of the summary estimates using fixed effect rather than random effect is 
preferable because the random effects estimate given greater relative weight to smaller studies and, 
will therefore, be more affected if publication bias is present 39 .Interpretation of funnel plots is 
facilitated by inclusion of diagonal lines representing the 95% confidence limits around the summary 
estimates, i.e.[summary effect estimate –(1.96 x standard error)] and [summary effect estimate 
+(1.96 x standard error)] for each standard on the vertical axis.  This show the expected distribution of 
studies in the absence of heterogeneity or of selection bias: in absence of heterogeneity, 95% of the 
studies should line within the funnel plot defined by these straight lines. Because these lines are not 
strict 95% limit, they are referred to as “pseudo 95% confidence limits”.  
3.6.1 Asymmetry as explanation of publication bias.  
 
Asymmetry is one of the possible explanations of bias. The more pronounced the asymmetry, the 
more likely is that the amount of bias will be substantial. In this funnel plot, we can see that there is 
not so much asymmetry. However, we have to consider that publication bias is only one of a number 
of a possible explanation for funnel plot asymmetry. For example, trial of lower quality yield 
exaggerated estimates of treatment effect40.  Smaller studies are, on average, conducted and 
                                                          
39
 Poole and Greenland, 1999.  
40
 Schulz ET all 1995.  
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analyzed with less methodological rigor than larger studies41, so asymmetry may also result from the 
overestimation of treatment effect in smaller studies of lower methodological quality.   
 
3.6.2 Reasons of funnel plot asymmetry. 
 
In detailed way, Egger at all in 1997 listed a possible different reason for which we can have funnel 
plot asymmetry as:  
1. Selection bias (publication bias, location bias, languages bias, multiple publication bias);  
2 True heterogeneity (Size of effect differs according to study size: Intensity of intervention, 
Differences in underlying risk);  
3 Data Irregularities (Poor methodological design of small studies, inadequate analysis, Fraud);  
4 Artifact (Heterogeneity due poor choice of effect measure) 
5 Chances.  
In addition, other possible biases affecting the selection of studies for inclusion in meta analyses 
include the propensity of the results  affect the frequency with which a study is cited and, hence, its 
probability of inclusion in meta-analysis, and the multiple publication of studies with demonstrating 
an effect on intervention42.    
 
3.7 Contour- enhanced funnel plot.  
 
There is evidence that, generally, the primary driver for the suppression of studies is the level  of  
statistical significance of study results, with studies that do not attain perceived milestones of 
statistical significance( i.e. p< 0.05 or 0.01) being less likely to be published43. Despite this, there has 
                                                          
41
 Egger at all 2003 
42
 Tramer at all, 1997. 
43
 Easterbrook ET all 1991; Dickersin 1997; Ioannidis 1998).  
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not been  method previously considered to identify  the areas of the funnel plot that correspond to 
different level of statistical significance, to assess whether any observed asymmetry is likely caused by 
publication bias. On a countor-enhaced funnel plot is a funnel plot with contours of statistical 
significance in way to facilitate the assessment of whether the areas where studies exist are areas of 
statistical significance and whether the areas where studies are potentially missing correspond to 
areas of low statistical significance. If studies appear to be missing in area of low statistical 
significance, then it is possible that the asymmetry is due by publication bias.  Conversely, if the areas 
where studies are perceived to be missing are areas of high statistical significance, then publication 
bias is a less likely cause of the funnel asymmetry.                                                                                                    










            Figure 5   
                  Contour- enhanced funnel plot    
When the standard error is used on y axis of a funnel plot, it is conventional to reverse the axis so that 
the most precise studies are displayed at the top of the plot. As we can see, several studies are put on 
the highest part, so it means that all studies have a very good precision. Furthermore, comparing the 
figures, we have to take into consideration the fact that they are elaborated with two different 
commands in Stata: the first one with metafunnel command, the second with confunnel one. As it is 
easy to understand, they are very similar; the only difference is that in the second figure we have the 
addition of the contours of statistical significance. In this way it is easier to assess the proportion of 
studies published in the meta-analysis at and around statistical significance.                                              
In both figure there is a suggestion of not asymmetry. However, the area where missing studies are 
perceived includes regions of both low and high statistical significance (i.e. area crosses over the 
contours), suggesting studies that showed magnesium to be not significantly and significantly less 
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asymmetry if it is believed studies are being suppressed because of mechanism based on two-sided p-
values.                                                                                                                                                        
However, it is important to emphasize the difference between the pseudo 95% confidence limits 
produced by metafunnel command  in the figure 4 and the contours of statistical significance 
produced by metafunnel in the figure 5(Peter et al 2008). The pseudo 95% confidence limits illustrate 
the expected 95% confidence interval about the pooled fixed-effects estimate for the Meta analysis. 
The pseudo-confidence limits therefore help to assess the extent of between-study heterogeneity in 
the meta-analysis and the asymmetry on the funnel plot. Unlike the pseudo-confidence limits, the 
contours of statistical significance are independent of the pooled estimate; therefore, if the pooled 

















3.7.1 Analyzing missing studies on one sided significance test.  
 
If there could be evidence showing that some studies could be suppressed considering one side 
(instead of two sides) significance test, this can be verified using the Stata Command confunnel(with 
one side option). Unlike the standard version, in this case the area where studies are perceiving is 
with the region of low statistical significance.  Under this assumption, it is more reasonable to 
consider publication as the potential cause of funnel asymmetry. In this context, the one-sided 
assumption implies that studies showing magnesium to be harmful are likely to be suppressed 
regardless of the significance of the results.  
 
          Figure 6 

























However, the graphs clearly shows as there are less estimates in low statistical significance, so it 
means that there are few studies that have been lost I using also this advanced test to verify bias by 




3.8 Measuring   Asymmetry Publication Bias: The Egger’s Test.   
 
The last way to test publication bias is to use a linear regression approach to measure funnel plot 
asymmetry on the ES (study effect, in this case youth employment elasticity). The ES is regressed 
against the estimate’s precision, the latter being defined as the inverse of the standard error 
(regression equation: ES= a+ bx precision, where a is the intercept and b is the slope).   This type of 
test has been proposed   by BEGG and Maunder (1994) and by Egger ET all (1997). The test proposed 
by the last one is algebraically identical to a test that there is no linear association between the 
treatment effect (or in this case youth employment elasticity) and its standard error, and hence, that 
there is no straight-line association in the funnel plot.                
Since precision depends largely on sample size, small trials will be close to zero on the horizontal axis 
and vice versa for larger trials.  The test of the null hypothesis that the intercept equal to zero is not 
significant at the 0.05 alpha levels indicates that the line goes through the origin. The actual p-value is 
0.228 (see results below) indicating that there is strong evidence in the data to not support rejection 








Egger’s Test for small study effects: 
Table 6 
Effect estimate against its standard error.  
Number of estimations =161    
    
  
 Slope  0.32*** 
  (0.90)  
Bias   -4.51 
  (3.73) 
















Further, the sign of the coefficient (-4.51) suggests that small studies don’t overestimate the effect. 
The slope coefficient (0.32), with high statistical significance, which is an estimate of theta (that in a 
weak sense might be considered to be adjusted for the effects of publication bias) is greater than the 
effect estimated from meta-analysis estimating random effect (0.02) (it  is going to  be discussed in 



















3.9 The Empirical model/s.  
 
Regarding the empirical model, following Card ET all (2009) and BoockMann (2010), it has been  
decided to build two different empirical models.  In particular, the first one considers an order probit 
model, while an alternative approach is to perform   a Meta regression. However, we have to consider 
that both models contain the same independent variables that have been derived studying the 
characteristic of the paper selected.   
3.9.1 The Ordered probit model.   
                     
 In the ordered Probity model the dependent variable y*(significance) measures the scale of 
significance.                          
Yi - (1, 2, 3, 4,) for (significantly negative (5% level) insignificantly negative and positive, significantly 
positive (5 % level).  
The interval discussion role is: 
yi=1     if     yi* ≤ u1 
Yi=2     if     u1 < yi* ≤ u2 
Yi=3     if     u2 < yi* ≤ u3 
Yi=4     if     u3 < yi* ≤ u4.  
As the probit model, we will assume y* as function of observed and unobserved variables  
• Y = β0 + x1i β1 + x2i β2 …. xki βk + ε 
 First of all, there is a need to underline as the numbers have to be considered as a code, so it means 
that number 4 is not greater than 1.  





Significance  Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative  
1 36 22.36 
 
2 82 50.93 22.36 
3 33 20.5           73.29 
4 10 6.21 93.79 
             Total  161 100               100 
 
Analyzing the results, 50.93 per cent of the estimations results represent a negative but insignificant 
effect, while 22; per cent (36 estimations) represent a significant and negative effect. Of Course, no 
conclusion on the “true” effect of the minimum wage can be derived from these frequencies. The 
model is very common when we have many discrete outcomes that have a natural ordering but no 
quantitative interpretation. As explained before, the numbers in codes don’t mean anything, just an 
order to show the lowest and highest. The first thing that we can say is that because of the studies of 
references doing consider all the same definition of “young”, dummies variables have been included. 
In particular, we have three dummies variables for the age, one for paper which include people until 
16 years old,  the second one including people between 16 and 19 and the last one for the studies 
that consider people with age different from the first and second  dummies variable. Regarding the 
gender, few data represent a distinction between male and female, while major paper restricts 
attention to low skilled workers. Considering the level of aggregation data, we distinguish between 
studies based on individual-level and aggregate data, where the former either relative to individuals 
or firm or establishment, or survey. All these differences have been included in the model using   
dummies variables. Regarding independent variable we take into consideration the institutional 
quality data by Aljaz Kunzic; it is very important because the role of the institutions have to be 
considered as the underlying basis for economic and social activity. He builds  three groups of formal 
institutions: legal, political and economic, which capture to a large extent the complete formal 
institutional environment of country. Finally, it has been included 4 dummies variables which 
represent the country included in the paper: country is America, country1 country2 country3 
represent respectively Spain New Zealand and Canada.   
96 
 
 3.9.2 Results and interpretation.  
 
The estimates   (ordered probit coefficient) are displayed in the table for different six specifications. 
The dependent variable is coded such a negative coefficient implies a higher likelihood of a negative 
estimated effect on employment. First of all, regarding the results, in the ordered probity model (as in 
the probity model) we can interpret only the sign but not the magnitude of them. The most important 
thing to consider is that the Kaitz Index is always significant, (at 5 or 1 per cent). Analyzing the signs, 
we can see as only in the first specification it is positive, (it means that if Kaitz Index increases there is 
a higher probabilities to be in higher categories, that is significantly positive at 5 per cent), while in the 
other one it is negative (it means that with a higher Katz index it has higher probabilities to be in 
lower categories, that in this case means significantly negative (5% level). Concerning the variables for 
different populations group, no significant results are found, that is confirmed to the previous 
literature on this field44. Dummy variables for studies are either positive or negative but always not 
statistical significant.  There is no indication of publication bias in the sense that negative and 
significant results are published with higher likelihood than insignificant or positive employment 
effects. Finally, regarding country dummies variables, there is a strong evidence that they don’t 
influence the estimations (in fact only in one case country America is significant), it is because Kaitz 
Index gives us the possibility to control for different legal definition that minimum wage has in the 
selected countries.  Finally there is a need to underline the meaning of cut (1, 2, and 3):  first of all 
their standard errors compare the cut-point to 0, but the aim is  to not understand the numbers, we 
don’t have care about that; the aim is to know if they are different from each other. This can be made 
to test for quality of these cut points; the null hypothesis is that three cut points are equal, 
furthermore an important thing to take into consideration is that if they are equal, we can eliminate 
the middle category/code (is this case 2 and 3 codes). However,  as we can see from the table, the 
joint test always reject the null hypothesis that three cut points are equal; so the middle codes of the 
dependent variable have to be taken into consideration. 
 
                                                          
44
 See, for example: Booman, Berhard (2010): The combined employment effect of minimum wages and labor market 
regulation: A meta-analysis.  
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Table 8  
Specification  Oprobit  Oprobit(1)  Oprobit(2) Oprobit(3)  Oprobit(4) Oprobit(5) Oprobit(6)  
                
Kaitz Index  -14.7* -18.64** -18.69** 18.69*** -18.91*** -18.77*** -18.3*** 
  (-7.45) (-7.88) (7.88) (6.98) (6.87) (6.95) (6.53) 
School        -0.13 -0.13 -0.21 -0,25 
        (0.31)  (0.31) (0.35) (0.30) 
Age          -0.54 -0.61 -0.54 
          (0.41) (0.44) (0.41) 
Age1            -0.10 -0.10 
            (0.24) (0.24) 
Age2                
                
Low skill workers 0.23 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 
  (-0.27) (-0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) 
Gender      0.01   0.19 0.23 0.23 
      (0.03)   (0.34) (0.36) (0.36) 
Aggregate  0.21 -0.02 -0.02 -0.21 0.07 0.03 0.03 
    (-0.03) (0.03) (0.32) (0.39) (0.40) (0.04) 
Country             1.66** 0.04 0.04 0.44 0.44 0.4 0.4 
  (-0,94) (-1,2)                (1.20) (1.20) (1.20) (1.20) (1.20) 
Country 1   -1.87 -1.88 -1.88** -1.89 -1.88 -1.89 
    (-1.16) (-1.16) (1.16) (1.16) (1.16) (1.16) 
Country 2                
                
Country 3      -0.13 -0.1 -0.09 -0.13 -0.13 
      (-1.1) (1.10) (1.10) (1.10) (1,10) 
Epl              -0.52** 
              (0.26) 
Union density              0.12 
              (0.3) 
Pseudo R  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
                
Cut 1 -11.11 -9.33 -9.14 -9.07 -9.09 -9.02 -9.02 
  (-3.8)               (3.0) (3.28) (3.28) (3.28) (3.29) (3.29) 
Cut 2  -9.49 -8.46 -8.6 -8.22 -8.24 -8.17 -8.17 
   (-3.76)                 (+3) (-3.2) (3.27) (3.27) (3.27) (3.27) 
Cut 3  -7.1 6.99 -0.14 -6.74 -6.75 -6.68 -6,75 
  (-3.73) ( -2.98) (-1.1) (3.25) (3.25) (3.26) (-3.25) 
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Test for Cut   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                
N Obseravations   161 161 161 161 161 161 161 
  
 
3.9.3  Institutional variables.  
 
 
Institutional variables could be very useful to describe countries’ regulation system but it is not so 
clear if they have a different impact on the estimates of the minimum wage effect if they are taken 
separately.                                               
Following Boockman, in this occasion we take into consideration two institutional variables such 
employment protection legislation and union density having unique estimates: this is what has been 
estimated in the last column (preferred). However, only EPL is significant, so it means that in this case 













3.10 Meta regression model.  
 
The second/different approach is to perform a Meta regression on study level summary data. As 
explained before, we assume that Meta regression and ordered probity model have the same 
independent variables45; the only difference regards the dependent variable: in fact while in the order 
probity it is a code, in Meta regression it is composed.                              
Regarding the independent variables, they are exactly the same of the order probit model, while the 
dependent variable changes.  In fact, considering the different approach of the models, in     Meta 
regression it will be all the 161 points estimate of youth employment elasticity. Consequently, also 
the interpretation of thing results change; in the sense that Meta regression doesn’t estimate the 
probability to be in higher or lower categories (or codes), but simply has to be interpreted as a 
multiple linear regression model.                                       
3.10.1 The empirical model.  
 
 
The model is specified as:  
                   
Where y is the effect size (in this case youth employment elasticity) in study j   
While    is the overall effect size. The variables x specify different  
Characteristics of the study, while   specifies the between study variation.  
However, we can choose between the models with fixed or random effect.  
                                                          
45
 It is clear because  has been used the same approach (systematic review): furthermore; the paper considered are 
exactly the same, so there has not been need to include different independent variable; also because in my opinion 





3.10.2 Fixed vs.  Random effect. 
 
Fixed effect model assumes that the sampled effect size   is normally distributed, where σ2   is the 
within study variance of the effect size , i.e.  =0. It is based on the assumptions that all studies in 
meta-analysis share a common true effect size. In other words, all factors which could influence the 
effect size are the same in all study populations, and therefore the effect size is the same in all study 
populations. It follows that that the observed effect size varies from one study to the next only 
because of the random effect error inherent in each study.  
It is represented by the following equation:  
                   
In this case σ2   is the variance of the effect size in study j. However, we have to take into consideration 
that fixed effect Meta regression ignores between study variations. By contrast, the Random effect 
assumes that studies were drowning from population that differ each other in ways that could impact 
on the treatment effect. For example, the intensity of the intervention or the age of the subjects may 
have varied form one study to the next. It follows that the effect size will vary from one study from 
the next for two reasons: the first is random error between studies as in the fixed effect model, while 
the second is true variation in effect size from one study to the next.  Finally, it rests on the 
assumptions that are a random variable normally distributed following a hyper distribution. Random 
effect Meta regression is represented by the following equation: 
    
                                                                    +    




3.10. 3 Random or fixed effect model? 
 
Meta-regression has been employed as a technique to derive improved parameter estimates that are 
of direct use to policy makers. Meta-regression provides a framework for replication and offers a 
sensitivity analysis for model specification. There are a number of strategies for identifying and coding 
empirical observational data. Meta-regression models can be extended for modeling within-study 
dependence, excess heterogeneity and publication selection.  The fixed effects regression model does 
not allow for between study variations. The random or mixed effects model allows for within study 
variation and between study variations and is therefore the most appropriate model to choose in 
many applications. Whether there is between studies variations (excess heterogeneity) can be tested 
under the assumption that effect sizes are homogeneous or have a tendency to a central mean. 
Unfortunately, we don’t have the best model to always use in any case, but we can have some 
indicators that are able to “indicate” which model to use.                                                                                 
For example, when we believe that all studies included are functionally identical and that the effect 
size is not generalized for other specification but only for the identified population, then we have to 
use fixed effect.                                                                                                                     
Considering all this, the choice has been to perform a meta-regression with both fixed and random 
effect, analyzing the differences between them.               
 
3.10.4. Meta regression fixed effect regression: results and interpretations.  
 
The table below has the aim to show a meta-regression using fixed effect.    
As we can say from the estimation, also in this case the Kaitz Index has a statistical significant impact. 
The sign, as In the ordered probit model is negative ; so it means that using this method of estimation 
the unitary increasing of minimum wage has a negative  and very significant effect on youth 
employment elasticity  ( considering different specifications, from 12.86 to 13, 28%,).  Regarding the 
other variables, as in in the order probit model, we don’t have significant result for the population 
group (holding other things equal). The intercept is in the most cases statistical significant, with both 
positive and negative sign. Considering the dummy variables, a negative coefficient indicates that the 
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null category yields a less youth employment elasticity effect while a positive coefficient indicates the 
opposite. Regarding country effect, they are statistical significance only in few cases and this is true 
only for a partial part of the country considered. Considering the dummy variable school (value 0 if 
not enrolled, 1 otherwise), the two statistical specifications don’t have the same sign (speficification2 
+0.40, specification 3 -0.85), underlining as being enrolled in school can impact both positively 
(0.40%), or negatively (-0.85%) on youth employment elasticity.  Considering the dummy for age, only 
age, only age2 (age not included in included in age1 and age2 has a significant impact on youth 
employment elasticity. Regarding the type of the data, its use seems to have a statistical and 
significant impact on youth employment elasticity only in two estimations.  















Table 9                   Meta regression with fixed effect. 
        Dependent variable= youth employment elasticity. 
Specification  VWLS (1) VWLS (2)  VWLS (3) VWLS (4)  VWLS (5) VWLS (6) 
              
Katz Index  -12.86*** -13.28*** -13.28*** -13.28*** -13.28*** -13.28*** 
  (5.04) (5.10) (5.10) (5.10) (4.28) (4.30) 
School      0.40*** -0.86*** 0.71 0.71 
      (0.18) (0.88) (0.60) (0,60) 
Age        0.87* 0.00 0.00 
        (0.38) (0.3) (0,3) 
Age1              
              
Age2          -1.2* 1.2* 
          (0.4) (0.4) 
Skilled  0.10   0.10 0.10     
  (0.15)   (0.15) (0.15)     
Gender          -1.11 -1.11 
          (1.13) (1.13) 
Aggregate  -0.20 -0.25   0.15*** 0.15*** -0,15*** 
  (0.17) (0.19) (0.03) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) 
Country   -0.73** -0.75* 0.75 0.75 0.75  0.75 
  (0.42) (0.43)               (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
Country 1      0.79* 0.79 0.79   
      (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)   
Country 2              
              
Country 3              
              
Epl            -0.70 
            (0.37) 
Union Density            -0.25 
            (0.4) 
 Interc.  -4.04 -4.96 4.17 -1.94 -1.94 -1.94 
  (1.44) (1.83) (1.44) (2.68) (2.68) (2.86) 
  
         
104 
 




3.10.5 Random effect meta regression   
 
 
Considering that Meta regression with Random Effect uses a more conservative approach; it has been 
estimate using meager command in State, Random Effect Multilevel Model (REML) specification 
















                                                          
46
 Source: Stata Journal 
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  Table   10 
 
 
Specification   REML  REML (1) REML (2)   REML (3) REML(4) REML (5)  REML(6)  
                
Kaitz Index  -1.17* -1.17* -0.93* -0.92* -1.19* -1.28* -1,28* 
  (0.65) (0.65) (0.51) (0.51) (0.61) (-0,67) (-0,67) 
School      0.79*** 0.79*** -0.79*** -0.86*** -0.86*** 
      (0.13) (0.13)  (0.13) (0.15) (0,15) 
Age        -0.5 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 
        (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Age1            0.72 0.72 
            (0.79) (0.79) 
Age2              0.50 
              (0.7) 
Low Skilled workers             0.54 0.54 
            (1.21) (1.21) 
Gender    0.04 0.69 0.06 0.06 0.10 0,10 
    (0.48) (0.49) (0.5) (0.05) (0.51) 0,51 
Aggregate  0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15* 0.15 0.13 0,13 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.70) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.17) 
Country  -0.14 0.04 0.14   -0.18 0.00 0,00 
  (0.78) (0.49)               (0.26)   (0.35) (0.32) (0,32) 
Country 1          0.19 0.19 0.19 
          (0.25) (0.25) (0,25) 
Country 2                
                
Country 3          0.07 0.05 0.5 
          (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) 
Epl              -0,60** 
              (0.30) 
Union density              -0.55 
          (0.32) (0.32) (1.6) 
Tau2  0,02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
                
I-Squared  97.30% 96.36% 96.36% 96.38% 96.39% 95.93% 96.00% 
                                
Adjusted R squared   0.41% 0.39% 0.40% 27.89% 28.17% 31.94% 33.00% 
                
Intercept  0.56 -0.68 0.56 -0.61 -0.95 0.96 -0.96 
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  (1.00) (1.20) (1.00) (1.30) (1.39) (1.40) (1.40) 
                
N Obseravations   161 161 161 161 161 161 161 
                






As it is very easy to  understand,   the   independent variables  are  in great part  not statistical 
significant ; it confirms the more conservative approach of  meta- analysis with random effect 
model47: in fact  only the dummy variables school has a statistical significance  only in two regressions; 
while in fixed the estimators have  statistical significance in several cases. However, there is a need to 
underline as, also if with lower statistically significance, kaitz index has always a negative effect on 
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 See, for example, Jon P. Nelson (2013): Estimating the price elasticity of beer: Meta-Analysis with heterogeneity, 





This chapter was born with the aim to give a real contribution to a very important issue such as the 
size of the impact of the minimum wage on youth employment.             
To do this, meta-analysis method of estimation has been used taking into consideration several issues 
such as publication bias and asymmetry.                 
The first and most important step too is the collection of data; this has to be done paying more 
attention, first all because it can cause publication bias, but also because it influences estimates.    
After showing more and different way to verify and publication bias, next step has been to build an 
econometric model to understand in empirical way what has been explained before.         
The first considered model,  is a probit model one, which considers as dependent variable  the scale of 
significance(from 1 to 4): all the estimate clearly shows as minimum wage expressed as Kaitz Index 
has a negative impact( in different percentage and including  different explanatory/control  variables) 
on youth employment elasticity.                              
However, the same job could do using another technique denominated meta-regression: the 
variables are the same; the only difference is that in this case the dependent variables are noting a 
code but it is composed. It can be performed considering random effect or fixed effect: random effect 
is some cases are preferred to the fixed one; however, to avoid any debate, both models have been 
estimated also to figure out which could be the difference and above all why.                         
To sum up, both model additionally confirm the negative impact  of  the minimum wage(expressed as 
Kiaitz Index) on  youth employment elasticity; also if there is as need to underline how differences 
between estimates(fixed effect shows a stronger impact; however in both specifications; the 
coefficient is negative  and significant at 1 per cent.            
The conclusion is that, also if with different level of significance, but using different econometric 
model; we are able to definitively conclude as the minimum wage as a negative impact on youth 
employment; it has been a great debate in the literature in the last 15-20 years, and this chapter, tries 
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